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The Third Age of Oil and Gas Law
JAMES W. COLEMAN*
History’s biggest oil boom is happening right now, in the United States, ushering in
the third age of oil and gas law. The first age of oil and gas law also began in the
United States a century ago when landowners and oil companies developed the oil
and gas lease. The lease made the modern oil and gas industry possible and soon
spread as the model for development around the world. In the second age of oil and
gas law, landowners and nations across the globe developed new legal agreements
that improved upon the lease and won these resource owners a larger share of the
benefits of oil and gas production. The third age of oil and gas law, which is now
beginning, will be defined by three forces. First, fracking is transforming the
common law doctrines that underlie oil and gas law and policy. Second, both private
and public landowners are perfecting agreements that can win them a greater share
of the oil and gas under their land. Third, public landowners are beginning to seek
ways to balance their efforts to extract maximum value from their oil with their
efforts to limit climate change.
This Article is the first to identify these ages of oil and gas law, which have been
central to the development of law, the global economy, and the modern world. It also
reveals the legal and economic logic of agreements between oil and gas companies
and public and private landowners, and how they have evolved over the past century.
And it describes how landowners could ensure maximum benefit from the
unprecedented oil boom now transforming global oil production.

* Associate Professor, Southern Methodist University, Dedman School of Law. J.D.,
Harvard Law School; A.B., Harvard University. Special thanks to Owen Anderson, Karen
Bradshaw, Caroline Cecot, Bernard Clark, Anthony Colangelo, Jennifer Collins, Joseph
Dancy, Eric Fry, Guillermo Garcia Sanchez, Jayni Hein, Bruce Huber, Ryan Koopmans, Yael
Lifshitz, John Lowe, William Magnuson, Trey Murphy, Natalie Nanasi, Tukeni Obasi, Ari
Peskoe, David Pierce, Richard Pierce, Tara Righetti, Ann Schwarz, Fenner Stewart, Shelley
Welton, Elizabeth Wilson, and Hannah Wiseman for helpful comments.
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INTRODUCTION
Oil is the lifeblood of the global economy.1 The internal combustion engine forever
changed global transport, trade, and war—rendering every car, ship, armored
vehicle, and plane dependent on oil supplies.2 For the last century, the price of oil
has determined whether the world economy boomed or stagnated, and oil reserves
have often determined how the world’s wealth is distributed.3 Over these same years,
access to oil has been the cause of conflicts and often determined these conflicts’
fates.4 The history of oil tells much of the history of the modern world: the rise of the
United States as a global superpower, the defeat of the Axis powers in World War

1. Donald H. Ford, Controlling the Production of Oil, 30 MICH. L. REV. 1170, 1170 n.1
(1932) (“Save the products of agriculture, the products of oil are the most essential to the
processes and requirements of our present civilization.”).
2. John C. Jacobs, Unit Operation of Oil and Gas Fields, 57 YALE L.J. 1207, 1207 (1948)
(quoting Hail v. Reed, 54 Ky. (15 B. Mon.) 479, 490 (Ky. 1854)) (“In less than a century,
petroleum has changed from ‘a peculiar liquid not necessary nor indeed suitable for the
common use of man’ to a substance indispensable to the military security and economic
prosperity of a modern nation.”).
3. Rex G. Baker & Erwin N. Griswold, Percentage Depletion – A Correspondence, 64
HARV. L. REV. 361, 362 (1951) (“Both in peace and in war the country must have and is very
dependent upon oil and gas. Our civilian economy and the national safety would be
jeopardized if we failed to maintain adequate reserves of petroleum.”); James D. Hamilton,
Historical Oil Shocks 26 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 16790, 2011)
(since World War II all but one U.S. recession was preceded by a spike in oil prices).
4. See Wm. E. Colby, The Law of Oil and Gas: With Special Reference to the Public
Domain and Conservation, 30 CALIF. L. REV. 245, 245 (1942) (“Without petroleum modern
warfare would be impotent and hence we have the life and death struggles which are now
going on in the world to reach and control the sources of supply.”).
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II, the wave of multinational investment in the developing world followed by
nationalizations, and the birth of an increasingly multi-polar world order.5
Likewise, this Article shows that the history of oil and gas law tells much of the
story of legal development over the past century: the foundational role of the
common law, and property law in particular, increasingly supplemented and
supplanted by statutes and regulations, and a growing judicial willingness to enforce
sophisticated contracts and defer to regulations written by expert agencies. Oil and
gas law has also been a crucible for key trends in international law: new emphasis on
choice of law, growing reliance on arbitration to settle disputes with sovereigns, and
increasingly complex and finely articulated contracts and treaties to set out the duties
between companies and sovereign nations. This Article unearths these histories and
defines these two ages of oil and gas law that have built the modern legal world. It
shows that we are now entering a third age of oil and gas law, which will be defined
by the legal challenges posed by fracking and climate change. And it shows how
landowners can ensure that they receive the full benefit of this decade’s oil boom—
the biggest that the world has ever seen.
Part I describes the first age of oil and gas law, which was born in the United
States at the dawn of the twentieth century. It was driven by new oil supply in Texas
and new demand for oil from motor vehicles around the world. The three key legal
developments of the first age of oil and gas law were the rule of capture, the lease,
and the leases’ analogue for nations—the concession. All three were designed to
encourage rapid oil extraction. The rule of capture is the principle that a landowner
owns all the oil that can be extracted from her land, even if it comes from a reservoir
shared with a neighbor. The lease is the way that landowners benefit from these
resources: rather than selling their land outright, landowners trust an oil and gas
company to develop it in return for a share of oil and gas production. In these early
days, developing nations often gave oil companies concessions for oil development
that mirrored the early leases signed by private landowners in the United States. In
fact, in the first half of the century, savvy U.S. landowners often leased under better
terms than the sovereigns that gave oil companies concessions covering vast tracts
of land in the Middle East that are now synonymous with oil production.
Part II describes the second age of oil and gas law, which began when the global
powers realized that oil was both finite and key to their future economic and military
might. It saw a transition from the United States as the uncontested center of world
oil production to a new center of power in the Middle East. It shifted focus from
rapid oil production to maximizing the long-term value of production. States placed
increasing limits on the rule of capture—limiting how many wells could be drilled
and how fast oil could be pumped, and pushing owners to develop oil and gas
reservoirs efficiently, with maximum production at minimum cost. And public
landowners in the developing world, increasingly independent from the old Western
powers, renegotiated or nationalized their old concessions, catching up with and then
surpassing private landowners in the sophistication of their contractual arrangements
with oil and gas companies.
Part III describes the third age of oil and gas law, which is just beginning.
Directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing, or “fracking,” has unlocked the largest

5. See infra Parts II, III.
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oil boom the world has ever seen. It quickly made the United States the world’s
largest producer of petroleum. Then, as the boom accelerated in 2018, the United
States increased its oil production faster than any country has ever done. As a result,
for the first time, countries around the world are realizing that climate regulation may
limit oil consumption long before dwindling oil supply does. This new age of oil and
gas law will be defined by fracking; increased climate regulation; and sophisticated
private, public, and institutional landowners. Fracking has in some ways limited the
traditional problems of production from common reservoirs while simultaneously
creating new complications for the rule of capture. At the same time, public
landowners are learning how to balance the traditional imperative of encouraging
production with new efforts to cut greenhouse gas emissions. Finally, public and
private landowners are perfecting the structure of oil and gas agreements with oil
companies; this Article describes further steps they could take to ensure maximum
benefit from the new oil and gas boom.
I.

THE FIRST AGE OF OIL AND GAS LAW

The first age of oil and gas law began ten days into the twentieth century, when
the Spindletop gusher blew out in Beaumont, Texas, on January 10, 1901.6 The
Beaumont boom was not the world’s first oil boom; there had been nineteenthcentury oil booms in Pennsylvania and in Baku, now part of Azerbaijan but then part
of the Russian Empire.7 But the Beaumont boom changed the world. Most
importantly, it coincided with the development of the automobile and the internal
combustion engine, which created a seemingly unending demand for petroleum
products.8 And it also cemented the United States as the world center of the oil
industry, as the world’s leading industrial power, and the world’s leading producer
of oil for the next sixty years.9

6. See BERNARD F. CLARK, JR., OIL CAPITAL: THE HISTORY OF AMERICAN OIL,
WILDCATTERS, INDEPENDENTS AND THEIR BANKERS 52–54 (2016); DANIEL YERGIN, THE
PRIZE: THE EPIC QUEST FOR OIL, MONEY AND POWER 66–76 (3d ed. 2012); Alexandra B. Klass
& Danielle Meinhardt, Transporting Oil and Gas: U.S. Infrastructure Challenges, 100 IOWA
L. REV. 947, 959 (2015).
7. See YERGIN, supra note 6, at 3–15, 41–43. Some of the earliest oil wells were drilled
accidentally by prospectors trying to produce salt. CHARLES AUSTIN WHITESHOT, THE OILWELL DRILLER: A HISTORY OF THE WORLD’S GREATEST ENTERPRISE, THE OIL INDUSTRY 22–24
(1905).
8. The previous oil booms had focused on producing kerosene, a cheap substitute for
more valuable whale oil. See RICHARD RHODES, ENERGY: A HUMAN HISTORY 138–44 (2018);
PETER TERTZAKIAN, A THOUSAND BARRELS A SECOND: THE COMING OIL BREAK POINT AND
THE CHALLENGES FACING AN ENERGY DEPENDENT WORLD 19–20 (2007) (describing how
“kerosene became the most sought-after illuminant on the market” because most consumers
could not afford sperm whale oil anymore); HAROLD F. WILLIAMSON & ARNOLD R. DAUM,
THE AMERICAN PETROLEUM INDUSTRY: THE AGE OF ILLUMINATION 1859–99, at 232–51 (1959);
cf. HERMAN MELVILLE, MOBY DICK 478 (Penguin Books 1988) (1851) (describing how when
whalers illumined their modest ships with their precious oil “you would have almost thought
you were standing in some illumined shrine of canonised kings and counsellors”).
9. By 1928, “the United States produced 68% of the world’s total.” J. Howard Marshall
& Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum Production, 41 YALE L.J. 33, 33 n.2

2020]

OI L A ND GA S LA W

393

The three key developments of the first age of oil and gas law were the rule of
capture; the lease for private landowners; and its analogue for state owners of oil and
gas, the concession. These public and private legal rules each were designed to
encourage rapid oil production. The rule of capture meant that quick drilling could
gain landowners an outsized share of the oil trapped in reservoirs beneath shared
land. And the lease and concession offered resource owners a share of oil production
from their lands, giving the landowner an interest in rapid and robust production.
A. The Rule of Capture
The first age established the rule of capture—the principle that a landowner owns
all the oil that can be extracted from his or her land.10 In the United States,
landowners own the minerals beneath their property.11 This principle is
anachronistically known as the ad coelum principle,12 which literally means, “to the
heavens.”13 It is taken from the Latin phrase ad coelum et ad inferos—meaning that
a landowner owns from the heavens above, coelum, to hell below, inferos.14 So in
the United States, the gold, silver, or coal in the earth generally belongs to the owner
of the surface above.15 In the rest of the world, the minerals in the earth generally
belong to the state, not individual landowners.16

(1931) (citing U.S. BUREAU OF MINES, WORLD’S PRODUCTION OF CRUDE PETROLEUM IN 1930,
ANNUAL PETROLEUM STATES 75a (1930)). By 1932, the United States still “produce[d] 62%
of the total supply of the world.” Ford, supra note 1.
10. See Kelly v. Ohio Oil Co., 49 N.E. 399, 401 (Ohio 1897) (noting that oil pumped from
a landowner’s well “belongs to the owner or lessee of the land” because “no one can tell to a
certainty from whence the oil, gas, or water which enters the well came” so the “right to drill
and produce oil on one’s own land is absolute and cannot be supervised or controlled by a
court or an adjoining landowner”).
11. Monika U. Ehrman, One Oil and Gas Right to Rule Them All, 55 HOUS. L. REV. 1063,
1064–65 (2018).
12. JOHN S. LOWE, OIL AND GAS LAW 54 (6th ed. 2013).
13. Lora D. Lashbrook, The “Ad Coelum” Maxim as Applied to Aviation Law, 21 NOTRE
DAME L. REV. 143, 143 n.1 (1946) (citing BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (3d ed. 1933)).
14. CLARK, supra note 6, at 10; LOWE, supra note 12.
15. Del Monte Mining & Milling Co. v. Last Chance Mining & Milling Co., 171 U.S. 55,
60 (1898) (“The general rule of the common law was that whoever had the fee of the soil
owned all below the surface, and this common law is the general law of the States and
Territories of the United States . . . .”); CLARK, supra note 6, at 7 (“In spite of the patchwork
provenance of lands that came to form the U.S., the private landowner has owned both the
surface and all minerals beneath his land in every state in the union.”). This is the default rule:
landowners can sell the minerals below their land. See infra notes 52–53 and accompanying
text.
16. See, e.g., CLARK, supra note 6, at 12 (“By the end of World War I, the strategic and
economic potential of oil was recognized and nations that permitted private mineral ownership
nationalized their hydrocarbon resources.”). Some nations, such as Canada, provide for private
ownership of minerals in some circumstances. See, e.g., Orphan Well Ass’n v. Grant Thornton
Ltd., [2019] S.C.R. 5, para. 11 (Can.) (Supreme Court of Canada adopting Stewart’s private
theory of property ownership of oil and gas resources in Canada); Fenner L. Stewart, How to
Deal with a Fickle Friend? Alberta’s Troubles with the Doctrine of Federal Paramountcy, in
ANNUAL REVIEW OF INSOLVENCY LAW 2017 163, 204 (Janis P. Sarra & Barbara Romaine, eds.)
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Oil and gas is governed by the rule of capture.17 This rule somewhat modifies the
ad coelum rule: it says that a landowner owns all the oil and gas that can be extracted
from his or her land.18 Oil and gas is fluid, so when a landowner pumps oil and gas
from her land, it often draws oil and gas from under her neighbor’s land.19 As a result,
a landowner does not own all the oil under her land as securely as she owns the coal
under her land: if her neighbor pumps the oil out from a shared reservoir under her
land, it belongs to the neighbor.20 Thus, landowners own the oil and gas under their
land subject to the rule of capture. Conversely, the rule of capture means that a
landowner may own more oil than was originally under her land: if she pumps oil
from a shared reservoir, she owns that oil even if it came from under a neighbor’s
land.21
Why did American courts establish the rule of capture? The main benefit of the
rule of capture is that it makes it unnecessary to determine where the oil pumped out
of the ground came from.22 Early courts knew very little about oil reservoirs or how
oil traveled under the earth.23 Courts knew it sometimes bubbled out of the earth and
could be pumped out; they knew that, eventually, no more oil could be pumped.24

(detailing the differences between the legal recognitions of private oil and gas ownership in
Canada and the United States).
17. Bruce M. Kramer & Owen L. Anderson, The Rule of Capture—An Oil and Gas
Perspective, 35 ENVTL. L. 899, 899 (2005) (“The rule of capture has been an integral part of
oil and gas law since the completion of the first commercial oil well in Pennsylvania in the
1840s.”); Karen Bradshaw Schulz & Dean Lueck, Contracting for Control of Landscape-Level
Resources, 100 IOWA L. REV. 2507, 2526 (2015) (citing BRUCE M. KRAMER & PATRICK H.
MARTIN, THE LAW OF POOLING AND UNITIZATION § 2.01 (3d ed. 2013)) (“[T]he ‘rule of
capture’ doctrine . . . emerged in all oil–gas states.”).
18. Robert E. Hardwicke, The Rule of Capture and Its Implications as Applied to Oil and
Gas, 13 TEX. L. REV. 391, 393 (1935) (explaining that the owner of the well may keep this oil
without compensating the neighbor because “[t]he owner of a tract of land acquires title to the
oil or gas which he produces from the wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part
of such oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands”).
19. CLARK, supra note 6, at 57 (“The fugacious nature of oil and gas and the permeable
nature of the oil-bearing formation underground allow oil to flow without regard to surfaceproperty boundaries, resulting in that a property owner can be producing his neighbor’s oil
and gas as well as his own.”); Jacobs, supra note 2.
20. Hardwicke, supra note 18; see also Yael R. Lifshitz, Rethinking Original Ownership,
66 U. TORONTO L.J. 513, 525–26 (2016).
21. Hardwicke, supra note 18 (“The owner of a tract of land acquires title to the oil and
gas which he produces from wells drilled thereon, though it may be proved that part of such
oil or gas migrated from adjoining lands.”).
22. Id. at 397 (“It is quite clear that the rule of capture was based on an admitted inability
to determine with reasonable accuracy the source of production from any well.”).
23. Courts speculated that oil under the ground was “wild and will run away,” Barnard v.
Monongahela Nat. Gas Co., 65 A. 801, 802 (Pa. 1907), and that it could “percolate restlessly
about under the surface of the earth, even as the birds fly from field to field and the beasts
roam from forest to forest,” Medina Oil Dev. Co. v. Murphy, 233 S.W. 333, 395 (Tex. App.
1921), cited in CLARK, supra note 6, at 58. For an alternate view that courts were, or at least
should have been, better informed on the working of oil and gas reservoirs see TERENCE
DAINTITH, FINDERS KEEPERS? 18–50 (2010).
24. See Ford, supra note 1, at 1172–73 (describing misconceptions about the nature of oil
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But they did not know where the oil had come from—perhaps the oil came from
under many neighbors’ lands.25 If they had strictly followed the ad coelum doctrine,
judges would have had to divide the oil pumped from a surface well among all the
landowners whose subsurface may have once held the oil.26 Instead, the judges
adopted the simple rule of capture: if the oil is pumped out of a well on your land, it
is your oil.27
The rule of capture has many other benefits and costs. One benefit is that it
encourages production of oil. If the rule of capture applies, then as soon as your
neighbor begins drilling for oil, you are experiencing what could be called an “oil
and gas emergency.” If the neighbor completes the well and begins pumping oil, she
will likely begin to pump oil from a shared reservoir beneath your land.28 Your sole
remedy is to begin drilling yourself—that is the only way to ensure that you get your
fair share of the common oil reservoir that likely underlies your two properties.29
And all of your other neighbors face the same logic.30 So the rule of capture
encourages rapid development: a race to produce oil.31

and gas reservoirs); Note, The Ownership of Natural Gas and Some Real Property Concepts,
36 VA. L. REV. 947, 949 (1950).
25. See Hardwicke, supra note 18, at 394 (“Neither a barrel of oil nor a cubic foot of gas
has any characteristics, by reason of its previous existence under any particular tract of land,
which clearly distinguish it from oil or gas produced from wells on the adjoining tracts.”); see
also David E. Pierce, Minimizing the Environmental Impact of Oil and Gas Development by
Maximizing Production Conservation, 85 N.D. L. REV. 759, 760 (2009) (“The ‘rule of capture’
was initially a rule of necessity that quickly became the foundational principle for defining
rights in oil and gas.”).
26. See CLARK, supra note 6, at 60 (“The rule of capture was not so much a ‘right to
capture,’ but more of an absolute defense to liability for draining the adjoining owners’
reserves.”); Hardwicke, supra note 18, at 394 (explaining that oil cannot “be earmarked or
branded as are cattle so that one may readily identify such oil or gas as having originally been
in place as a part of a particular tract”).
27. Hardwicke, supra note 18, at 394. Note that this rule does not allow drilling into a
neighbor’s subsurface. That is called “slant drilling” and the courts consistently forbid it.
LOWE, supra note 12, at 67.
28. See CLARK, supra note 6, at 57.
29. Northcutt Ely, Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas. A Symposium, 53 HARV.
L. REV. 1070, 1071 (1940) (reviewing Legal History of Conservation of Oil and Gas: A
Symposium (1938)) (under the rule of capture “an adjoining landowner’s only remedy was to
‘go and do likewise’”).
30. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 220–23 (“Because of the rule, every operator everywhere in
the United States put down his wells and produced as rapidly as he could, draining not only
the oil under his own property but also that under his neighbor’s property, before his neighbor
drained his own.”).
31. PETROLEUM CONSERVATION 249 (1951) (“If oil and gas underlay his property they
would escape to his neighbor unless he reduced them to possession beforehand by drilling
wells on his own property. Self-protection forced each owner of a tract of ground overlying
an oil pool to drill quickly as many wells as he could and to produce each well at its utmost
capacity.”). It does not, however, authorize negligence that damages the reservoir shared by
the neighbors, which would create liability to the neighbor that could otherwise have produced
the oil. Elliff v. Texon Drilling Co., 210 S.W.2d 558, 563 (Tex. 1948). Such negligence
violates what are known as the neighbors’ correlative rights. Elliff, 210 S.W.2d, at 562.
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This imperative to produce also comes with several downsides: a race to produce
creates waste.32 First, it leaves oil in the ground. You can never extract all the oil in
an underground reservoir, but efficient extraction can produce many times more oil
than a haphazard approach.33 The oil is under pressure underground that helps it rise
to the surface; if you steadily pump it out with the right number of wells, you
maximize recovery.34 If you puncture the reservoir with too many wells, reservoir
pressure drops and you will not be able to extract as much oil.35 And if you pump too
fast, too much water may become mixed into the oil.36 This water weighs down the
lighter oil, making it harder to
pump, and the water is
expensive to separate and
dispose of because it often
contains
dangerous
chemicals37—if too much
water is mixed in the oil it
may no longer be worth
producing.38 So too many
wells or extracting too quickly
can mean producing less oil
overall.
Second, a race to produce
may mean that society spends
far more than necessary on oil
wells.39 Why should each Venice Beach, California, 1931. Source: USC Libraries.

32. CLARK, supra note 6, at 55–62.
33. Northcutt Ely, The Conservation of Oil, 51 HARV. L. REV. 1209, 1220 (1938); see
LOWE, supra note 12, at 44 (“About 3/4th of all the oil discovered still remains where it was
found.”). Careful reservoir management can mean the difference between recovering less than
ten percent of the oil in place and upwards of fifty percent. Id. at 22–23.
34. Ely, supra note 29 (“In the older pools, 90 per cent of the original oil content was left
underground; in the finest ones, perhaps 25 per cent.”).
35. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 222 (“To dissipate gas through helter-skelter production was
to lose that essential pressure, and thus to leave large amounts of petroleum unrecovered
underground.”); Howard R. Williams, Conservation of Oil and Gas, 65 HARV. L. REV. 1155,
1159 (1952) (overdrilling caused “dissipation of native reservoir energy”).
36. LOWE, supra note 12, at 23 (“uncontrolled” pumping causes “reservoir water [to]
‘channel’ and begin to be produced alongside . . . the oil and gas”).
37. Branch v. W. Petroleum, Inc., 657 P.2d 267, 270 (Utah 1982) (describing expense of
disposing this water which contains “oil, gas and high concentrations of salt and chemicals”).
38. See Note, Administrative Regulation of Petroleum Production, 59 HARV. L. REV.
1142, 1142 (1946) (“Poor production methods and excessive production rates, through
dissipation of reservoir energy and drowning of oil strata by water encroachment, result in
leaving a large percentage of oil inert in the ground with recovery possible only at prohibitive
cost.”).
39. LOWE, supra note 12, at 615 (“There was a tendency to deplete each pool as fast as it
was physically possible for the well to produce the oil. Drilling was continued until the
declining production of old wells indicated that a new well would not recover its cost. This
resulted in a very close spacing of wells in rich pools and wider spacing in pools of lower
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neighbor drill her own expensive oil well when all the oil in the reservoir could be
extracted with just two or three wells? 40 By encouraging more wells, the rule of
capture encourages inefficient spending on drilling duplicative and unnecessary oil
wells.41
Third, these extra wells are unsightly and damage the environment.42 Each new
well is an eyesore—creating an “iron orchard” spreading across the land.43 Each time
a well drills through the water table it creates a chance of contaminating water
supplies.44 Every new well could cause a blowout that would lead to wasted oil
spilling across the property’s surface.45
Finally, from the perspective of a dominant oil producer, such as the United States
and Texas were in the 1930s, overproduction created another problem: low prices.46
A normal producer must simply try to survive periods of low prices.47 But a dominant
producer sometimes can actually increase profits by selling less, because offering
less product for sale raises prices so much that the producer earns more overall even

yield. The density of drilling bore no relation to the number of wells actually required to
recover the oil, and tremendous waste in the form of unnecessary development costs
resulted.”).
40. Williams, supra note 35, at 1164 (arguing that the rule of capture “results in
uneconomic use of materials and labor in the drilling of unnecessary wells”).
41. See Hardwicke, supra note 18, at 419 (“[I]f one well would efficiently and
economically drain ten acres, the drilling of two wells should not be required . . . .”).
42. See Williams, supra note 35, at 1164.
43. TOM PENDLETON, THE IRON ORCHARD (1966); see Harold Hotelling, The Economics
of Exhaustible Resources, 39 J. POL. ECON. 137, 144 (1931) (“Consequently great forests of
tall derricks rise overnight at a cost of $50,000 or more each; whereas a much smaller number
and a slower exploitation would be more economic.”).
44. Caroline Cecot, Regulatory Fracture Plugging: Managing Risks to Water from Shale
Development, 6 TEX. A&M L. REV. 29, 39–40, 39 fig.2 (2018) (categorizing risks to water
from oil and gas production, including drilling); Lauren A. Patterson et al., Unconventional
Oil and Gas Spills: Risks, Mitigation Priorities, and State Reporting Requirements, 51 ENVTL.
SCI. & TECH. 2563, 2569 (2017).
45. See YERGIN, supra note 6, at 82 (describing Spindletop blowout).
46. CLARK, supra note 6, at 71–88; Marshall & Meyers, supra note 9, at 33 (1931).
47. See J. Howard Marshall & Norman L. Meyers, Legal Planning of Petroleum
Production: Two Years of Proration, 42 YALE L.J. 702, 736–40 (1933) (describing why a
single state cannot benefit by cutting production but a coalition of states can).
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though it is selling less oil.48 During the 1930s, the United States alone produced
over half of the world’s oil, and Texas often produced nearly half of U.S. oil—a more
dominant role than any state or nation has had since that time.49 As dominant

producers, the United States and Texas could have increased their profits by slowing
their race for oil production.
B. The Oil and Gas Lease
The oil and gas lease is the most common agreement that landowners make with
an oil and gas company to profit from the hydrocarbons under their land.50 To see

48. Of course, a normal producer cannot do this—if it cut its production in the hope of
generating higher prices, other producers would just take its place. And if its reduction had
any effect on the much broader oil market, that would only benefit the other producers that
took its place. The ability to raise profits by cutting production—to control such a large share
of the market that when you cut production, prices rise more than enough to compensate for
selling fewer units—is the definition of market power. E.V. Rostow & A.S. Sachs, Entry into
the Oil Refining Business: Vertical Integration Re-Examined, 61 YALE L.J. 856, 905 (1952).
49. DAVID F. PRINDLE, PETROLEUM POLITICS AND THE TEXAS RAILROAD COMMISSION 4,
71 (1981) (Texas production reached 45% of U.S. production by 1953); Ford, supra note 1;
James D. Hamilton, Historical Oil Shocks 8 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper
No. 16790, 2011) (“Texas . . . accounted for 40% of the crude petroleum produced in the
United States between 1935 and 1960.”). Today, the world’s biggest oil producers—Saudi
Arabia, the United States, and Russia—each only produce about twelve percent of the world’s
oil. U.S. Energy Info. Admin., The United States Is Now the Largest Global Crude Oil
Producer, EIA: TODAY IN ENERGY (Sept. 12, 2018), https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy
/detail.php?id=37053 [https://perma.cc/J4VK-G8Z8].
50. See David E. Pierce, Rethinking the Oil and Gas Lease, 22 TULSA L.J. 445, 445–48
(1987) (“The framework for [the lease] was established shortly after the turn of the century
and has remained unchanged since that time.”); Ernest E. Smith & John S. Dzienkowski, A
Fifty-Year Perspective on World Petroleum Arrangements, 24 TEX. INT’L L.J. 13, 18–19
(1989); A. W. Walker, Jr., Nature of the Property Interests Created by an Oil and Gas Lease
in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 1, 12–13 (1928); A. W. Walker, Jr., Nature of the Property Interests
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why landowners usually lease, rather than sell, their land to an oil and gas company,
take the perspective of the landowner. If you are lucky enough to have oil under your
land, it could be worth a lot of money. But how much? And how do you get this
money?
The most straightforward solution would be to extract it yourself. But landowners
almost never have the capital or know-how to extract oil from their own land—not
to mention the equipment, technology, time, or work force.51 So you will have to
bring in an oil company to extract your oil. How do you get this company to pay you
what your oil is worth?
The simplest way to get money from an oil company would be to sell the company
the oil under your land.52 Property law allows you to sell the oil under your land to
an oil company and keep the surface for yourself—this is known as a “severance” of
the “mineral interest” because it severs the interest in the oil and gas minerals beneath
the surface from the rest of the landowner’s interest in the land.53 In theory, a
landowner willing to sell her mineral interest could ask an oil company to pay the
full value of the oil under her land, minus the cost of extraction, minus a reasonable
profit for the company.54 As a simplified example, imagine that a landowner named
Laura knows that there are one million barrels of accessible oil under her land and
oil is worth $66 per barrel, so an oil company could take away $66 million of oil
from her land. Imagine an oil company named Ovid Oil Company believes that it
would have to pay $40 million to drill and operate wells to extract this oil.55 And
imagine Ovid wants a 10% profit on its oil investments.56 In this simplified example,

Created by an Oil and Gas Lease in Texas, 7 TEX. L. REV. 539, 539–40 (1929).
51. Note, Recent Trends in Oil and Gas Conservation Statutes, 25 VA. L. REV. 360, 361
n.6 (1938–1939) (“The majority of landowners lack sufficient capital to produce the oil
themselves, and consequently almost all production is carried on by operators, acting under
leases, who bear the expense of production and pay royalties to the landowners.”).
52. Mark P. Gergen, The Use of Open Terms in Contract, 92 COLUM. L. REV. 997, 1026
(1992) (noting that the least complex arrangement for economically benefiting from one’s oil
and gas would be to simply sell it).
53. A. W. Walker, Jr., Fee Simple Ownership of Oil and Gas in Texas, 6 TEX. L. REV. 125,
128 (1928) (“The landowner, however, may sever his estate in the oil and gas from his estate
in the remainder of the realty either by granting away his estate in the oil and gas or by
conveying his estate in the surface realty and reserving or excepting his estate in the oil and
gas.”). States differ on whether this severance grants a right to the oil in place or simply an
exclusive right to extract oil from the land, Lanre Aladeitan, Ownership and Control of Oil,
Gas, and Mineral Resources in Nigeria: Between Legality and Legitimacy, 38 T. MARSHALL
L. REV. 159, 161–68 (2013), but the important point is that, after this severance, all oil pumped
from wells on the land will belong to the oil company, not to the landowner.
54. The surplus value of a resource after subtracting the cost of extraction and the normal
rate of profit is known as its “economic rent.” PAUL SAMUELSON, ECONOMICS 526–28 (11th
ed. 1990).
55. So the net profit from the well, that the landowner and company must divvy up, would
be $26 million: $66 million minus the $40 million cost of extraction. Note that this simplified
example lumps together all the complex costs that go into drilling and operating a well such
as equipment, employees, taxes, and permit fees. For simplicity, it also ignores the time
discount of money—the reality that a dollar in a year is worth less than a dollar today.
56. Ovid would insist on a profit on its investment because there are always other
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Laura could ask the company to pay her $20 million for her oil: when Ovid extracted
the $66 million in oil, it would get its $40 million in investment back and the $20
million it paid Laura, plus its normal
10% profit—$6 million in this case, and
Laura would keep the rest. If Laura
charged $20 million for her oil, an
economist would say she had extracted
all the “rent” from her oil—rent is the
value of a resource after subtracting the
cost to extract it and the usual rate of
return that a company can demand in a
competitive market.57
In theory, someone who owns oil in
the ground would like to give the oil
company only a normal profit and
extract all the rent from the resource.58
In practice, however, an oil company
would never give Laura $20 million up
front in the example situation above.
There
are simply
too
many
uncertainties in the calculus that results in the company’s $6 million profit: there
could be less oil than estimated, it might be more expensive to drill and operate the
wells, the price of oil might fall.59 Keep in mind that Ovid Oil Company would have
to come up with money up front to both drill and operate the well and pay Laura—
$20 million for Laura and $40 million for the well—so Ovid would have to come up
with $60 million in ready cash. It would simply be too risky to pay such a giant sum
immediately for a stream of revenue that would eventually, even if everything goes
to plan, provide only the usual 10% rate of return.60 Oil and gas companies work very
hard to raise money to operate, and there are less risky ways for an oil company to
spend its money.61

opportunities to invest money at a profit. In reality, its demand for profit on any particular
investment would depend on the other opportunities available for investing its money.
57. SAMUELSON, supra note 54.
58. See Arlon R. Tussing, An Economic Overview of Resource Disposition Systems, in
PUBLIC DISPOSITION OF NATURAL RESOURCES 19, 21–22 (Nigel Bankes & J. Owen Saunders
eds., 1983) (explaining that resource owners should seek to lure investors with “hopes of
capturing some portion of the potential economic rent in the form of above-market rates or
return to investment” but “limit the rent actually appropriated by operators to the minimum
required to keep those hopes alive”) (emphasis in original); see also W.H. Ellis, Comment,
PUBLIC DISPOSITION OF NATURAL RESOURCES, supra, at 42–43 (discussing U.S. and Canadian
governments’ methods for capturing rent from oil and gas sales).
59. See Baker & Griswold, supra note 3, at 372 (describing why the risks of oil production
require a greater return than the typical investment).
60. What if the landowner offered the oil company the land for $12 million, so that the
oil company would expect to earn $8 million, a 20% profit on its $40 million investment?
Most oil companies would still be wary of such an investment: why pay all the money up front
when an oil and gas lease allows the parties to share the risk of a bad well?
61. For example, the oil company could spread its money across multiple leases, which
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Note that a straight sale would also be risky for Laura, the landowner. There might
be more oil than expected, or oil prices might go up and make the accessible oil on
the land worth far more than $66 million. Or new technologies might make it cheaper
to drill for oil, so Ovid might spend much less than $40 million to extract the oil.
And very profitable wells would be particularly unfortunate for Laura if she had
simply sold her full mineral interest: not only would she miss out on the economic
upside of these wells, she would have to deal with constant surface disruption from
Ovid Oil Company busily working its wells to harvest its bonanza of oil production.62
So a simple sale of oil and gas mineral rights is risky for both the landowner and the
oil and gas company: the landowner worries about selling a good well for too little
and the company worries about buying a bad well for too much.63
The solution to this problem is the oil and gas lease. Rather than paying money to
the landowner up front, the lease spreads the risk of a good well or a bad well between
the oil company and the landowner by paying the landowner a percentage of the oil
company’s production.64 This percentage of production is called a royalty.65 In the
first half century of oil production, oil companies typically offered a standard royalty
of 1/8 of production: 12.5%.66 If an oil well produced $100,000 in oil, the landowner

allows the company to share its risks with landowners. See infra notes 64–77 and
accompanying text.
62. The surface owner’s dissatisfaction could eventually be a problem for the oil and gas
company that simply purchased mineral rights because the surface owner, seeing no benefit
from production, might try to find ways to openly or covertly limit production. See Pierce,
supra note 50, at 474 (noting that a sale of the minerals can lead to “time-consuming . . .
[s]urface use disputes”). For a general description of how disputes between minerals and
surface owners can be managed through public and private governance, see Tara Righetti,
Contracting for Sustainable Surface Management, 71 ARK. L. REV. 367 (2018).
63. Oil and gas is an inherently high-risk business. For example, over the fifteen-year
period from 1944–58, the rate of “successful” wells hovered around 19.7%. Charles O. Galvin,
The “Ought” and “Is” of Oil-and-Gas Taxation, 73 HARV. L. REV. 1441, 1444 n.5 (1960).
64. This structure mitigates the “market for lemons” problem, which is that the
landowner’s willingness to sell might suggest that the resource is worth less than a buyer is
willing to pay, unraveling any deal. See George A. Akerlof, The Market for “Lemons”:
Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism, in UNCERTAINTY IN ECONOMICS 235 (Peter
Diamond & Michael Rothschild eds., 1978). By retaining a share of future production, the
landowner signals her belief that she is selling a share of valuable mineral rights. See Yoram
Barzel, Measurement Cost and the Organization of Markets, 25 J.L. & ECON. 27, 34–35 (1982)
(explaining how the same structure facilitates publishing deals); Gergen, supra note 52, at
1030 (explaining why this structure lowers risk for both parties, making a deal possible);
Ronald J. Gilson, Value Creation by Business Lawyers: Legal Skills and Asset Pricing, 94
YALE L.J. 239, 262–64 (1984) (explaining how such structures enable deals even with
asymmetric asset valuation); Victor P. Goldberg, The Net Profits Puzzle, 97 COLUM. L. REV.
524, 545–46 (1997) (explaining how the same asymmetries of information motivate profitsharing in the movie industry).
65. Robert E. Hardwicke, Jr., Problems Arising Out of Royalty Clauses in Oil and Gas
Leases in Texas, 29 TEX. L. REV. 790, 790–91 (1951). It is called a royalty because of the
tradition that the monarch received a fixed percentage of production of minerals from any
land. John S. Lowe, Defining the Royalty Obligation, 49 SMU L. REV. 223, 258 (1996) (“[T]he
King retained a ‘royalty’ right to take gold or silver . . . .”).
66. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1010 (“The lessee’s primary obligation is to pay the lessor
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would receive $12,500 in oil.67 As the wells produced more oil, the landowner would
receive more money. If the wells dried up, the oil company would no longer have to
pay anything, so the two parties share risk.68 And the royalty gives the landowner an
incentive to help (or at least not hinder) the oil company operating on her land: the
more oil that is produced, the more she receives.
So how could Laura structure a lease of her oil and gas rights to Ovid Oil
Company?69 The basic economics of the transaction remain the same: Laura and
Ovid both believe the company can extract about $66 million in oil if it spends about
$40 million on wells, so there is about $26 million in net revenue to split up. If Laura
used the traditional 1/8 royalty and everything went according to plan, she would
receive $8.25 million and Ovid would get the rest: $57.75 million. Ovid would earn
a profit of $17.75 million—a healthy 44% return on its $40 million investment.
As a savvy landowner, however,
Laura would probably ask for a
bigger royalty. She is realistic, so she
would not ask Ovid to plan on a
measly 10% profit, which would be
$4 million—after all, Ovid is taking
the risk of spending $40 million to
drill the well.70 But she thinks that
Ovid should be satisfied with
planning for a 20% profit: $8
million. If all goes according to plan,
Ovid would be left with $48 million:
$40 million for its expenses and an
$8 million profit, which would leave
$18 million for Laura. She wants $18
million of the $66 million in oil the

a share of production revenues, often one-eighth, as a royalty.”); John S. Lowe, Representing
the Landowner in Oil and Gas Leasing Transactions, 31 OKLA. L. REV. 257, 274 (1978) (“By
custom, the royalty, the share of the production reserved by the landowner for permitting
another to develop his land for oil and gas, is 1/8 of the gross production, except in some
western states where it may be 1/6.”); Ag Law in the Field: Nicholas Miller (Negotiating an
Oil and Gas Lease), http://aglaw.libsyn.com/episode-33-nicholas-miller-negotiating-an-oil
-and-gas-lease [https://perma.cc/D2HP-DNB5] (noting that standard was once a 1/8 royalty);
cf. Bruce R. Huber, The Fair Market Value of Public Resources, 103 CALIF. L. REV. 1515,
1526 (2015) (noting that federal law also uses the regular 1/8 royalty for coal leases).
67. See Lowe, supra note 66, at 229–30 (describing why landowners typically receive
their royalty share in oil but receive cash for their royalty share of gas).
68. See id. at 252 (“Essentially, the lease is an economic partnership between the lessor,
who owns the minerals, and the lessee, who possesses the money and expertise to develop the
minerals.”).
69. In reality the lease is most often drafted by the oil and gas company, id. at 259 n.10,
the lessee, but in a competitive market it gradually evolves to serve the interests of both parties.
70. Id. at 275 (“[T]he prevailing consensus among operators [is] that oil and gas
exploration and development is a risky business and that those engaged in it should receive
the major portion of any increase in market price.”).
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well should produce, so she asks for a royalty of 18/66, or 27.3%, of all the oil
produced.
Of course, everything may not go according to plan. If the wells were dry, Ovid
would lose the money it spent on drilling but at least it would not owe Laura anything.
If the wells produced more oil than expected, Ovid and Laura would both earn more
money. The lease lets them share the risk and gives them an incentive to cooperate
to ensure the oil wells produce as much as possible.71
In fact, the lease gives the landowner a stronger interest in rapid and robust
production than it gives the oil company. The landowner receives a share of
production without paying any costs, so the landowner’s preference is simple: the
more oil the better.72 The oil company, on the other hand, must also consider costs.73
Some wells are not worth drilling, even if the landowner would benefit from
receiving more royalty. And even if a well would be profitable now, it might be more
profitable in the future if the costs of drilling came down or the price of oil went up,
so it could be better to wait.74
In return for the royalty, the lease gives the oil company the exclusive right to
produce oil and gas from the landowner’s property for a period of years.75 First, the
oil company gets a “primary term”—a period of years during which the oil company
may explore for oil, drill, or simply consider its options.76 If the company strikes oil
and begins production during the primary term, it gets to keep the property
throughout a “secondary term”—in the United States, the secondary term typically
extends as long as oil and gas is produced.77 In other words, if the company starts

71. Giving both parties a share of the ultimate value of a product, rather than a simple flat
fee, is a common method of inducing cooperation in contracts. See Goldberg, supra note 64,
at 543–49 (explaining the motivation for such contingent compensation in the film industry).
As we will explore further, this traditional lease does not perfectly align the incentives of
landowners and oil companies, which is one reason for innovations in leasing and host country
agreements over the past century. See infra Section II.B.
72. And the time value of money means that sooner is better as well.
73. Bruce M. Kramer, The Interaction Between the Common Law Implied Covenants to
Prevent Drainage and Market and the Federal Oil and Gas Lease, 15 J. ENERGY NAT.
RESOURCES & ENVTL. L. 1, 1–8 (1995) (describing historical development of implied
covenants as a response to oil companies’ reluctance to drill); Jacqueline Lang
Weaver, Implied Covenants in Oil and Gas Law Under Federal Energy Price Regulation,
34 VAND. L. REV. 1473, 1486 (1981).
74. Gergen, supra note 52, at 1076.
75. Earl A. Brown, Jr., Elemental Principles of the Modern Oil and Gas Lease, 17 MONT.
L. REV. 39, 42–43 (1955) (“The right of the lessee to drill and produce has been affirmed as
an exclusive right within the strict sense of the word, whether or not the word ‘exclusive’ is
used in the granting clause of the lease.”).
76. Id. at 40–43.
77. Lowe, supra note 66, at 259 (“[T]he lease may be extended to a secondary term ‘for
so long thereafter as oil and gas are produced’ by production of oil and gas and payment of a
percentage of the gross production, free of the expenses of production, to the lessor.”)
(footnote omitted). Note that typically the lease will be extended by a single well, even if the
land could support many profitable wells. Id. at 282 (“Typically, the secondary term of the
habendum clause is invoked by the drilling and putting into production of a single well. Thus,
an oil and gas lease may be ‘held’ without obligation to pay delay rentals by the drilling of a
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producing oil and gas in the primary term, it can keep producing until all its wells
run dry.78 Wells regularly continue producing oil for decades, so if multiple wells
can be sited on a property, the lease on that property may be more or less permanent.79
Of course, the exclusive right to produce oil and gas means that the landowner
cannot allow another oil company to produce on the land. Let’s return to Laura’s
lease with Ovid Oil Company. Imagine that the lease has a five-year primary term
and that now, after one year, Ovid has not started drilling a single oil well. Ovid sees
no need to move quickly. Thus far, Laura has received no royalty—she will not get
her 27.3% royalty share until Ovid begins production and Ovid can keep waiting
because there are still four more years in the primary term.80 Meanwhile, Bendrix Oil
Company approaches Laura and says it will pay her a 30% royalty.81 Laura cannot
accept this better offer even though she still has not received any royalty from the oil
on her land because she is still in the primary term of her lease with Ovid. For this
reason, apart from the eventual royalty she will receive from oil production, Laura
will typically ask for money up front to compensate her for taking her land off the
market. As a result, oil companies almost always pay a bonus—a one-time cash
payment—to the landowner at the time of signing.82

single well, no matter how large the area covered by the lease.”).
78. To be precise, courts typically allow a lease to continue running so long as a well
continues to produce in “paying quantities”—that is, it is reasonably close to profitable.
Gergen, supra note 52, at 1010 & n.42; Pierce, supra note 50, at 467–70; see also Lowe, supra
note 66, at 277–78 (“Some courts considering the question have interpreted the word
‘produced’ as a shorthand for ‘produced in paying quantities to the lessee.’”) (citing courts in
Texas, Arkansas, Montana, and Oklahoma).
79. There are wells that have operated for 150 years and, in any event, you can often site
a new well on the property to continue production before a declining well runs dry. Ken Ward
Jr., Century-Old West Virginia Leases Yield Paltry Gas Royalties. A Suit Could Cut Others’
Payouts to a Trickle, Too., PROPUBLICA (Nov. 14, 2018), https://www.propublica.org/article
/west-virginia-leases-yield-paltry-gas-royalties [https://perma.cc/N2YT-LFTS] (describing
controversy over thousands of wells drilled since 1982 on leases as much as 112 years old);
Oldest Continually Operating Oil Well Marks 150 Years, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2011),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-oil-oldest/oldest-continually-operating-oil-well-marks
-150-years-idUSTRE77H5RP20110818 [https://perma.cc/6CUL-YT2Q].
80. See Weaver, supra note 73, at 1486 (“If the lessee does not develop the property, the
lessor will receive little in return for his grant.”).
81. Perhaps oil prices have risen or Bendrix thinks these oil wells will be more profitable
than Ovid does, or perhaps it is happy to pay her 30% of $66 million—$19.8 million—and
plan on recouping just $6.2 million on its $40 million investment.
82. LOWE, supra note 12, at 177 (“[L]essors are generally paid a bonus for executing the
lease, a payment that may range from a dollar to thousands of dollars per acre leased.”).
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Laura would have to negotiate her bonus with Ovid.83 It should be enough to
compensate her for taking her property off the market for five years. And it should
be enough to show that Ovid is serious about developing her property. If Ovid will
not give her a substantial bonus, it would be fair for Laura to worry that Ovid does
not really expect to develop her
property. Perhaps Ovid does not
believe that wells on her land will be
profitable unless oil prices rise; it
could just be taking a cheap option to
tie up her property for five years with
no intention of ever producing unless
oil prices move higher and make
Ovid’s share of production (after
paying Laura’s royalty) suddenly
look profitable.84 On the other hand,
if Ovid is willing to pay a substantial
bonus for the lease, it probably
intends to develop the property.
So Laura would ask for some of
her compensation up front as a
bonus.85 In our simplified example
above, Laura demanded a 27.3%
royalty, which, if all went according to the parties’ expectations, would end up giving
her $18 million over the course of the lease. Instead, Laura could ask for a $1.5
million bonus up front and a slightly lower 25% royalty. If all went according to plan,
this structure would end up paying her $16.5 million in royalty over the course of the
lease, so Laura would end up with the same $18 million in compensation overall:
$1.5 million as a bonus and $16.5 million as royalty. The difference is that she would
get $1.5 million up front and thus could be sure that Ovid was serious about
developing her property. If Ovid failed to develop the property in the first five years,
it would lose the lease, and she could keep the $1.5 million and lease the property to
another oil company.
On the other hand, Laura would have to balance her desire for a bonus with her
desire for a higher royalty. For the same reasons that she would not want to simply

83. The bonus can also be seen as compensation for the inconvenience of oil extraction
and oil company access to the land because, unlike the royalty, it is not tied to the value of the
oil and gas extracted. Dixon v. Mapes, 73 P.2d 1131, 1132 (Okla. 1937). One difficulty with
that interpretation, however, is that the bonus is paid even if the oil company never enters the
land. If a landowner wants compensation, apart from royalty, for access and surface damages,
the landowner should negotiate for that compensation up front. LOWE, supra note 12, at 189–
95.
84. See Gergen, supra note 52, at 1076 (“Because a lessee bears the entire cost of
exploration and development and reaps only part of the return . . . he has a strong incentive to
hold property out of production to speculate on an increase in price, even though the expected
return of development to the parties jointly or even to him individually is positive.”).
85. See id. at 1010 (“Under a typical oil and gas lease, the lessee makes a small bonus
payment to the lessor upon execution of the lease . . . .”).
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sell her oil and gas, she will not want a bonus so high that it limits her royalty too
much.86 After all, a royalty is the payment that will let her share in the upside of
unexpectedly good production on her land.87 So landowners typically want a bonus
large enough to show the company intends to develop the project but not so large
that it unduly limits the royalty that lets them share in the upside of the project.88
C. Early Oil and Gas Concessions
The oil and gas lease, developed in the United States, soon spread across the
globe. But in the rest of the world, the government owns the oil and gas in the ground.
Most often the national government, rather than the provincial or local government,
controls development of these resources.89 Oil companies negotiate agreements
known as “concessions” or “licenses” with these governments, but in the first half of
the twentieth century these agreements looked very much like an oil and gas lease. 90
For example, in 1933, Standard Oil of California signed a concession with the
Saudi government that gave it the exclusive right to produce oil and gas in an area
larger than the state of Texas for sixty years in return for £155,000 and a royalty.91
In 1901, the Shah of Persia agreed to a concession with the Anglo-Persian Oil
Company covering three quarters of the country for sixty years for a $100,000 bonus,
$100,000 in stock, and a 16% royalty.92 And the Turkish Petroleum Company, which
was controlled by the Anglo-Iranian Oil Company,93 signed a concession with the
government of Iraq that offered it a royalty on oil production but specified that no
royalty would be paid for the first twenty years of extraction.94 Thus, these early
concessions in countries that would one day dominate oil production sometimes

86. That is, if she demands most of her compensation as an up-front bonus, she would
likely receive less overall because of information asymmetries and would receive a smaller
share of the benefit of a very profitable well. See supra notes 52–63 and accompanying text.
87. LOWE, supra note 12, at 299 (“From a lessor’s perspective, the typical lessor prefers
not to pass up the chance of profiting from production, which profits could be many times
more than the money the lessee would be willing to pay for a lease without royalty.”).
88. Pierce, supra note 50, at 447 (“Bonus . . . payments are usually small in relation to
the . . . market value of the land . . . . The landowner’s primary compensation for . . . the [lease]
is the potential for risk-free riches in the form of royalty.”).
89. CLARK, supra note 6, at 12. Canada is, again, one of the exceptions; provinces control
most oil and gas production. See Stewart, supra note 16, at 204.
90. Smith & Dzienkowski, supra note 50, at 18–19 (“The Middle Eastern concessions
were strikingly similar to the oil and gas leases granted in the United States in the first three
decades of this century.”).
91. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 291; see ERNEST E. SMITH, JOHN S. DZIENKOWSKI, OWEN L.
ANDERSON, JOHN S. LOWE, BRUCE M. KRAMER & JACQUELINE LANG WEAVER, INTERNATIONAL
PETROLEUM TRANSACTIONS 430 (3d. ed. 2010); Note, From Concession to Participation:
Restructuring the Middle East Oil Industry, 48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 774 (1973). A roughly similar
arrangement was struck between Gulf Oil, Anglo-Persian Oil, and Sheikh Ahmad of Kuwait.
YERGIN, supra note 6, at 297.
92. SMITH ET AL., supra note 91, at 429.
93. The Anglo-Persian Oil Company later became British Petroleum. YERGIN, supra note
6, at 503.
94. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 201–02.
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offered oil companies terms far more generous than they would have received from
a small landowner in Texas.95
Developed countries have also used concessions based on the standard lease.96
Most often, these concessions set a standard royalty and then encourage multiple
companies to bid by submitting a bonus that they are willing to pay for the
concession.97 When bonuses come in very high this can be a sign, as with an
individual landowner, that royalties are too low.98 That is, the government could get
more value overall, and ensure it benefits from its best wells, by raising the royalty
and settling for a smaller bonus. If royalties are set too high however, oil companies
will simply not bid on many concessions; the high royalty share would make the
concession unprofitable, or at best marginal, even with a $1 bonus. Thus, a
government can monitor the bonuses paid by oil companies at auction to get a rough
idea of whether its royalties are extracting too little or too much value from its oil
and gas prospects.
II. THE SECOND AGE OF OIL AND GAS LAW
The second age of oil and gas law began in the years leading up to World War II,
as the world’s largest economies slowly realized two key facts. First, oil was the key
to military and economic power. Second, it was finite. The second age of oil and gas
law saw a shift in global oil production that was soon reflected in the global balance
of power. The United States, once the undisputed center of global oil production, saw
this role usurped by Middle Eastern countries that quickly moved to demonstrate
their independence from the United States and its allies.
The central event of the second age of oil production was the first war fought for
oil and determined by oil: World War II.99 The war achieved its global character

95. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 91, at 433 (“[T]he midwestern farmer who leased his
land to an oil company was now in a better contractual position than the Middle Eastern
sheik.”).
96. See id. at 419–20; see also Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act, 43 U.S.C. §§ 1301–
1356b (2018); TERENCE DAINTITH & GEOFFREY WILLOUGHBY, A MANUAL OF UNITED
KINGDOM OIL & GAS LAW 23–25 (1977); Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels:
Maximizing Social Welfare in Federal Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 15–17
(2018) (describing royalties under U.S. leasing system). Subnational units, such as states and
provinces, that own natural resources often use such systems as well. For example, because
U.S. states own natural resources under their public lands, including offshore lands, Texas
uses such a system. See TEX. NAT. RES. CODE ANN. §§ 32.107–1073 (West 2011).
97. KIRSTEN BINDEMANN, PRODUCTION-SHARING AGREEMENTS: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS
8 (1999).
98. See supra notes 85–88 and accompanying text.
99. Colby, supra note 4, at 245 (“Without petroleum modern warfare would be impotent
and hence we have the life and death struggles which are now going on in the world to reach
and control the sources of supply.”); see also YERGIN, supra note 6, at 229 (“The equation—
oil equals power—had already been proven on the battlefields of World War I . . . .”); Herbert
Feis, The Anglo-American Oil Agreement, 55 YALE. L.J. 1174, 1174 (1946) (describing how
oil was essential to strategic thinking about the war effort with countries lacking oil forced to
“bargain or barter” for oil, leaving them “dependent on the will or bounty of others”). See
generally ROBERT GORALSKI & RUSSELL W. FREEBURG, OIL & WAR: HOW THE DEADLY
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when Germany, facing dwindling oil supplies, invaded Russia with the goal of
securing its oil fields.100 The war further widened when the United States placed an
embargo on oil to Japan, prompting Japan’s attack on Pearl Harbor and the oil-rich
Dutch East Indies.101 And it was finally won by choking off the Axis powers from
oil, allowing United States, Russian, and Persian oil to power the Allied armed forces
to victory.102
After the War, the companies of the Allied powers—such as Standard Oil, AngloPersian, and Royal Dutch Shell—continued to ramp up their production around the
world.103 But the established, aging oil fields in the United States were forced to
impose conservation regulations to ensure their remaining resources were not
squandered.104 And countries in the developing world increasingly questioned
whether the early concessions that they had signed still served the public interest. 105
In 1960, OPEC, the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, was formed in
Baghdad, Iraq; it comprised Saudi Arabia, Venezuela, Kuwait, Iraq, and Iran.106
Working together over the next twenty years, these countries gradually pressured oil
companies to modify their lucrative long-term concessions, first providing the
countries with a greater share of their resource revenue, and finally nationalizing the
Western oil companies’ concessions with varied amounts of compensation.107 During
this same period, Middle Eastern oil came to dominate worldwide production; these
countries finally surpassed U.S. output in 1965, ending sixty years of American oil
dominance.108

STRUGGLE FOR FUEL IN WWII MEANT VICTORY OR DEFEAT (1987).
100. DIETRICH EICHHOLTZ, WAR FOR OIL: THE NAZI QUEST FOR AN OIL EMPIRE, at xiv (John
Broadwin trans., 2012); YERGIN, supra note 6, at 334–37.
101. See EDWARD S. MILLER, BANKRUPTING THE ENEMY: THE U.S. FINANCIAL SIEGE OF
JAPAN BEFORE PEARL HARBOR 221, 239–40 (2012); RONALD H. SPECTOR, EAGLE AGAINST THE
SUN: THE AMERICAN WAR WITH JAPAN 75 (1985) (explaining that the embargo put the
Japanese navy in an impossible situation that required invading the Dutch East Indies and war
with the United States); YERGIN, supra note 6, at 316–24.
102. See DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER, CRUSADE IN EUROPE 233, 368 (1948) (describing the
success of the Allies’ strategy of cutting off oil supplies to the Axis powers); GORALSKI &
FREEBURG, supra note 99; RHODES, supra note 8, at 265; YERGIN, supra note 6, at 346–48. In
1938, “the United States produce[d] about sixty per cent of the world supply.” Note, supra
note 51, at 360 n.2; see also MATTHEW HUBER, LIFEBLOOD: OIL, FREEDOM, AND THE FORCES
OF CAPITAL 3 (2013) (“As a representative of the U.S. House of Representatives put it in 1941,
‘The progress of the people as a whole depends upon this lifeblood of commerce and
industry—petroleum.’”); HUBER, supra note 102, at 115 (Nixon’s energy czar, William Simon
declared, “It is hardly an exaggeration to say that petroleum has become the lifeblood of our
economy.”).
103. See Feis, supra note 99, at 1175–81 (describing the efforts of the United States and
United Kingdom to develop oil reserves abroad).
104. See infra Section III.A.
105. See infra Section II.B.
106. YERGIN, supra note 6, at 522–23.
107. Note, From Concession to Participation: Restructuring the Middle East Oil Industry,
48 N.Y.U. L. REV. 774, 788–89 (1973); YERGIN, supra note 6, at 522–23, 580–87, 646–52.
108. 2006 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. ANN. ENERGY REV. 309 tbl.11.5; see also CLARK, supra
note 6, at 194–96.
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The shifting balance of oil production was quickly followed by an equally
profound shift in the balance of power under international law. In 1962, the United

Nations passed the Resolution on Permanent Sovereignty Over Natural Resources,
which acknowledged state sovereignty over natural resources but demanded that any
taking of investor property must be for matters of “public utility” and provide
“appropriate compensation” for violating investors’ settled expectations.109 By 1974,
the world had changed: the United Nations, its ranks swelling with newly
independent countries born in opposition to colonialism, passed the Declaration on
the Establishment of a New International Economic Order, which declared a right to
nationalization.110
Since this legal earthquake, Western oil companies have tried to regain some of
their legal footing, with varied success. Initially, companies tried to sue in Western
courts to enforce their established concessions which seemed, on their surface, so
similar to the oil and gas leases that are enforced every day by courts across the
United States.111 But U.S. courts were unwilling to treat these extraordinary foreign
bargains as run-of-the-mill domestic leases. For one thing, these concessions were
often drafted before courts around the world began to recognize that, contrary to the
conceit of a “common law,” there was no “transcendental body of law outside of any
particular State.”112 So these concessions often did not specify which state or nation’s
laws should be used to interpret the agreement.113 The companies may have blithely
assumed they were still operating under Anglo-American common law; the courts,

109. G.A. Res. 1803 (XVII), art. 1 ¶ 4 (Dec. 19, 1962), reprinted in 2 I.L.M. 223 (1963).
110. G.A. Res. 3201 (S-VI), ¶ 4(e) (May 9, 1974), reprinted in 13 I.L.M. 715 (1974).
111. See Patrick M. Norton, A Law of the Future or a Law of the Past? Modern Tribunals
and the International Law of Expropriation, 85 AM. J. INT’L L. 474, 475–85 (1991).
112. Erie R.R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64, 79 (1938).
113. On the crucial role of choice of law in the aftermath of Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins,
see Willis L. M. Reese & Edmund M. Kaufman, The Law Governing Corporate Affairs:
Choice of Law and the Impact of Full Faith and Credit, 58 COLUM. L. REV. 1118, 1124–27
(1958).
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however, applied the new petroleum laws of the nationalizing countries to negate
these claims.114
Since these early failures, companies have had greater luck persuading developing
nations, eager for new investment, to sign arbitral agreements that waive sovereign
immunity, allowing the companies to pursue arbitral claims when their investments
are nationalized.115 But new governments have often proven more than willing to
change the terms of established concessions, even if it may require paying an arbitral
award.116 The shifting sands of oil production have created a multipolar world that is
here to stay.
A. Limits on the Rule of Capture
As global conflicts showed that world power would depend on oil, the United
States began taking steps to conserve the remaining oil in its maturing fields. As
noted, the rule of capture encourages waste—waste of reservoir pressure dissipated
by too many wells pumping too fast, waste of money spent on these
counterproductive wells, and waste of land unnecessarily devoted to these excess
wells.117 In response, U.S. states established new regulatory bodies with the authority
to curb this waste.118 These new state regulators adopted two main types of
regulations: limits on how many wells could be drilled (and how much they could
pump) and incentives for landowners to team up and share the cost and profit from a
smaller number of wells.119
As U.S. oil production rose throughout the middle of the twentieth century, state
regulators began to place limits on how many wells could be drilled and how much
those wells could pump.120 Regulators promulgated density requirements that

114. Hunt v. Coastal States Gas Producing Co., 583 S.W.2d 322, 325 (Tex. 1979). Courts
have also refused to hear such claims by ruling that they are political questions, Occidental of
Umm Al Qaywayn, Inc. v. A Certain Cargo of Petroleum, 577 F.2d 1196, 1201 (5th Cir. 1978),
or blocked by sovereign immunity, Libyan Am. Oil Co. v. Socialist People’s Libyan Arab
Jamahirya, 482 F. Supp. 1175, 1177 (D.D.C. 1980).
115. See PETER D. CAMERON, INTERNATIONAL ENERGY INVESTMENT LAW: THE PURSUIT OF
STABILITY, at xlvii–xlviii (2010).
116. See Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez, The Hydrocarbon Industry’s Challenge to
International Investment Law: A Critical Approach, 57 HARV. INT’L L.J. 475, 479–80 (2016)
(explaining why arbitral awards have not deterred states from modifying their regulations).
117. See supra notes 32–49 and accompanying text.
118. These state bodies were coordinated by an Interstate Compact Commission
comprising the major oil producing states, minus California. Galvin, supra note 61, at 1475
n.101.
119. Gordon A. Goodwin, Elements of a Negotiated Unit Plan Including Both Private and
Public Lands, 5 UCLA L. REV. 362, 364 (1958) (“Most of the oil producing states have
enacted laws providing for well spacing, for limiting production of oil to maximum efficient
rates, or to market demand . . . .”).
120. LAWRENCE GOODWYN, TEXAS OIL, AMERICAN DREAMS: A STUDY OF THE TEXAS
INDEPENDENT PRODUCERS AND ROYALTY OWNERS ASSOCIATION 97–101 (1996) (describing
how the Texas Railroad Commission used allowables to manage statewide production); Wm.
E. Colby, The Law of Oil & Gas II: A Consideration of Landowners’ Rights, Particularly as
Developed in California, 31 CALIF. L. REV. 357, 369 (1943) (noting “restriction on unlimited
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dictated that there could only be one well for a given number of acres.121 In Texas,
often this meant one oil well for every forty acres.122 Regulators also issued spacing
requirements, forbidding wells too close to another well or to a property line.123
Finally, regulators set an amount of oil or gas that could be pumped per day, week,
or month, known as an “allowable,” to slow down the race for production.124
Regulators also encouraged, and sometimes even required, landowners to team
up and develop their oil and gas resources together.125 If spacing regulations meant
small landowners did not have enough land to drill a well, they could “pool” their
land with other owners and share the cost and profit of a well. 126 Regulators in some
states can also force reluctant owners to pool their land together to drill a single
well.127
Even more dramatic, the landowners above an extensive oil reservoir could all
come together and “unitize” their holdings so that they could drill multiple wells to
efficiently develop the reservoir.128 Many states now encourage such unitization by
forcing owners to enter a unit if enough of the reservoir’s other owners and well
operators agree.129 The state can also exert more subtle pressure by forbidding the
holdout owner from drilling its own wells, making clear that all new production will

drilling, . . . control of ‘reservoir energy’ and other similar regulations”); Marshall & Meyers,
supra note 47, at 702–26 (describing history of state production limits).
121. See, e.g., Kristen van de Biezenbos, Where Oil Is King, 85 FORDHAM L. REV. 1631,
1647–48 (2017) (summarizing Texas’s conservation regulations); J. Richard Emens & John
S. Lowe, Ohio Oil and Gas Conservation Law—The First Ten Years (1965-1975), 37 OHIO
ST. L.J. 31, 37 (1976) (explaining Ohio’s laws).
122. 16 Tex. Admin. Code §3.38(b)(2)(A); see also Robert E. Hardwicke, Oil-Well
Spacing Regulations and Protection of Property Rights in Texas, 31 TEX. L. REV. 99, 99
(1952).
123. See Jacobs, supra note 2, at 1208–10 (summarizing state conservation requirements).
124. Hardwicke, supra note 18, at 410–12 (explaining that a modern “legislature prohibits
the waste of oil and gas” which means it authorizes a board to set “the maximum allowable
production from any field” and then set “the allowable production for the various tracts or
wells” in the field); see also Ford, supra note 1, at 1190–200 (surveying state conservation
laws including pumping limits).
125. A. Allen King, Pooling and Unitization of Oil and Gas Leases, 46 MICH. L. REV. 311,
317–21 (1948).
126. Douglas C. Gregg, Community Leases and Pooling Clauses, 7 UCLA L. REV. 289,
290 (1960).
127. See Bennion v. ANR Prod. Co., 819 P.2d 343 (Utah 1991) (holding that such an order
is valid and not an unconstitutional taking of property).
128. Leslie Moses, Some Legal and Economic Aspects of Unit Operations of Oil Fields,
21 TEX. L. REV. 748, 761–62 (1943). Thus, while pooling is designed to bring enough land
together to drill a single well under local spacing regulations, unitization is generally done for
a whole series of wells covering an entire reservoir. Unitization also requires a much more
detailed understanding of the reservoir being produced for two reasons. First, to ensure
efficient extraction, all landowners above the reservoir should be included. Second, production
from a unitized field is usually divided in proportion to the amount of oil that could have been
extracted from each participant’s land. In contrast, pooling offers much more rough justice:
production is almost always just divided in proportion to the surface acreage that each
landowner contributes to the single well.
129. King, supra note 125, at 335–37; Note, supra note 51, at 363.
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only happen in the unitized reservoir.130 Or the state can simply “shut-in” all wells in
an oil and gas field until the owners negotiate a unitization plan.131 Unitization,
however, cuts against the grain of a long history of U.S. private oil and gas extraction,
so in the Unitied States it is usually only adopted in two circumstances: when there
has been no previous extraction in an area, or to enable enhanced recovery in very
old fields that can no longer be produced by traditional methods. 132
National regulators also moved to require unitization, not just for efficiency, but
also as a solution to geopolitical conflict over cross-border reservoirs.133 In the three
decades after World War II, oil companies began producing oil and gas in deeper and
deeper waters offshore that fell in areas of conflicting or uncertain jurisdiction.134
This race for deep water incited a great debate over theories of sovereignty and
national jurisdiction that is still raging.135 Unitization of cross-border reserves is the
method that states have used to manage these conflicts over sovereignty.136
B. Foreign Alternatives to the Lease
Countries eventually realized that although an oil and gas lease was preferable to
a simple sale of resources, it still could be improved upon. For one thing, the lease’s
simplicity means that it wins the landowner too little money from the very best wells
and takes too much money from an oil company drilling a marginally profitable well.
Second, oil and gas leases were designed for the individual landowners that own the
bulk of U.S. oil and gas, so it contains terms that are not well designed for a sovereign
nation looking to develop vast swaths of land over decades. As a result, countries
developed new types of host country agreements to benefit from their growing oil
production.
1. New Agreements on Profit Sharing
A simple bonus and royalty lease does not take enough money from surprisingly
profitable wells. Conversely, it takes too much money from marginal oil and gas
prospects, preventing any development of wells that might otherwise provide a

130. See Baumgartner v. Gulf Oil Corp., 168 N.W.2d 510 (Neb. 1969).
131. Owners in Buck Draw Field Area v. Wyo. Oil & Gas Conservation Comm’n, 721
P.2d 1070, 1080 (Wyo. 1986) (allowing regulators to shut-in existing oil and gas wells until
owners agreed on unitization plan).
132. Such fields are often flooded with water or gases that are injected into the reservoir
from old oil and gas wells to force more oil and gas to the surface. If state regulators did not
authorize this unitization, pushing gas or water under neighbors’ land might be viewed as an
actionable trespass. See FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306
(Tex. 2011); R.R. Comm. v. Manziel, 361 S.W.2d 560 (Tex. 1962).
133. See Guillermo J. Garcia Sanchez & Richard J. McLaughlin, The 2012 Agreement on
the Exploitation of Transboundary Hydrocarbon Resources in the Gulf of Mexico:
Confirmation of the Rule or Emergence of a New Practice?, 37 HOUS. J. INT’L L. 681, 695–96
(2015).
134. Id.
135. Id. See generally United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, arts. 2–3, opened
for signature Dec. 10, 1982, 1833 U.N.T.S. 397.
136. See generally Sanchez & McLaughlin, supra note 133.
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modest profit to both an oil company and a host country. How can a country
simultaneously ensure it takes full value from the best wells but still encourage oil
companies to develop marginal plays? The answer is profit sharing, which countries
now regularly implement through two types of host country agreements: the
production sharing contract and the joint venture.
To understand why profit sharing helps, let us take another example. Imagine that
a country, Norland, is looking to negotiate a concession with Icarus Oil Company.
The concession is expected to produce $120 million of oil and require $80 million in
development costs.137 Norland has traditionally used a 20% royalty. So if all goes as
planned, Norland will receive $24 million, and Icarus will be left with $96 million.
Thus, Icarus will get its $80 million investment back, plus a 20% profit of $16
million.
Imagine, however, what happens if the well proves more profitable than
advertised. Suppose that Icarus’s well actually produces $200 million in oil, not $120
million, at the predicted $80 million price of development.138 Perhaps it produces
more oil than expected, or maybe the price of oil just went up. Under its concession,
Icarus would pay the government somewhat more: the 20% royalty would mean a
$40 million payment to the government. But Icarus’s net profit would be
dramatically increased. After paying its royalty, it would have $160 million left
over—it would have doubled its $80 million investment. Norland would have
received $40 million from this bonanza well and Icarus would have made a 100%
profit of $80 million.
Now consider what would have happened under a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement.
The country would have received $60 million of the $120 million net revenue from
the project. And the company could hardly have complained; it would still make a

75% return—$60 million of profit on its $80 million investment. So a net-profits
interest ensures that the government receives more value from bonanza wells without
seriously discouraging private investment.
A net-profits interest, unlike a royalty interest, also ensures that the government
gets at least some benefit from marginal prospects. What if Icarus found out that the

137. For simplicity, let’s imagine that this $80 million in costs includes the bonus that
Norland would have demanded in return for this concession.
138. So the well-produced $120 million in net revenue: $200 million in oil minus the $80
million cost of development.
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well would be $10 million more expensive than expected—that is, it would cost $90
million? Under the traditional royalty system, it would still owe 20% of production:
$24 million of the $120 million of oil produced. But its $120 million in oil, minus its
$90 million investment and its $24 million royalty, would leave only $6 million in
profit. Would it go forward with such an investment? Probably not—so neither the
government nor the company would make any profit at all from this well. The oil
would stay in the ground.139 The government would receive no royalty and it would
also miss out on a company investing $90 million that might help support local jobs
and industry.
Again, consider what would happen under a 50-50 profit-sharing agreement. If
Icarus’s exploration showed that its costs would be $90 million, it would expect that
its net revenue would be $30 million. It would give half of this to the government, so
the government would receive $15 million, and it would keep $15 million for itself.
Would it be willing to spend $90 million for a profit of $15 million—that is, a 17%
profit? Probably. So the profit-sharing system would benefit both Norland and Icarus
by ensuring that the well was developed and giving both parties a significant, if
modest, payout.

To secure a net-profits interest, countries developed two new types of host country
agreements to make with private oil companies: the joint venture and the production
sharing contract. Both of these new types of host country agreements typically
employ a government-owned oil production company known as a national oil
company.140 The simplest way of ensuring a share of net profits is the joint venture
agreement: the national oil company receives a percentage of the concession
agreement through a joint venture with the private international oil company chosen

139. Note that the royalty creates a conflict of interest between the government, which
would still receive a handsome royalty if the well was drilled, and the company, which would
not receive enough profit to make the well worthwhile. As Judge Posner explained in Finley
v. Marathon Oil Co., “conflict of interest is built into any royalty arrangement.” 75 F.3d 1225,
1230 (7th Cir. 1996).
140. Ever since these national oil companies were formed, they have played a pivotal role
in the international oil industry and global geopolitics. See e.g., BAKER INST., THE ROLE OF
NATIONAL OIL COMPANIES IN INTERNATIONAL ENERGY MARKETS (2007),
https://www.bakerinstitute.org/center-for-energy-studies/role-national-oil-companies
-international-energy-markets/ [https://perma.cc/AYH4-LE4P].
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to develop the prospect. Thus, the private international oil company, often called an
IOC (“international oil company”), simply shares profits with the public national oil
company, often called an NOC (“national oil company”), as though they were
partners.
The second new type of host country agreement is the production sharing contract,
first developed by Indonesia.141 This contract has several characteristic features,
including that the private international oil company technically works for the public
national oil company.142 But the production sharing contract also provides
compensation to the host country that approximates a net-profits interest.143 To
accomplish this, the production sharing contract allows the oil company to take a
greater share of production while it is recovering its costs. 144 Oil extracted while the
company is still recovering its costs is known as “cost oil”; in theory, the company’s
share could be as high as 100%.145 After the IOC recovers its cost, it then must share
a much higher percentage of the oil it produces to ensure the country fully shares in
the profits from a very profitable well.146 This oil—the oil that comes after the
company has recovered its costs—is known as “profit oil.”147
Profit sharing has some downsides as well. The biggest drawback is that the
resource owner must account for the costs of the oil company to ensure that the share
of the profits it receives truly reflects the profitability of the company’s oil wells.148
This is why private leases in the United States generally use a simple royalty, and
not a net-profits interest—a net-profits interest forces the landowner to verify an
accounting of the profits of the oil company.149 This can be complicated because the

141. See generally BINDEMANN, supra note 97, at 10; SMITH ET AL., supra note 91, at 463–
69; Robert Fabrikant, Production Sharing Contracts in the Indonesian Petroleum Industry, 16
HARV. INT’L L.J. 303, 313 (1975).
142. In practice, however, the national oil company typically leaves nearly all decisions to
the international oil company. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 91, at 467–68.
143. BINDEMANN, supra note 97, at 1.
144. Id.
145. Id. at 14.
146. Id. at 1.
147. Id.
148. Another industry that uses net-profits interest is the film industry, and scholars have
developed the term “Hollywood Accounting” to describe the inflated expense claims that can
eat into or entirely devour the net-profits interest of creative artists. Goldberg, supra note 64,
at 524–25. See generally Tim Connors, Beleaguered Accounting: Should the Film Industry
Abandon Its Net Profits Formula?, 70 S. CALIF. L. REV. 841, 863–75 (1997). Film companies
have routinely been found liable for inflating cost claims to reduce what is paid out in net
profits. See Celador Int’l, Inc. v. ABC, 499 F. App’x 721 (9th Cir. 2012) (affirming $269
million award against Walt Disney Co. for improperly deducting costs from net profits).
149. To verify that they are paid accurate royalties, landowners simply need to know the
volume of oil or gas produced and the amount that that oil and gas was worth. This is much
simpler but still results in many disputes when there is a question what produced gas is worth.
Because it is so expensive to transport gas, which generally must be moved by pipeline, the
price of gas varies significantly by location. James W. Coleman, Pipelines & Power-Lines:
Building the Energy Transport Future, 80 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 272–73 (2019); James W.
Coleman, Beyond the Pipeline Wars: Reforming Environmental Assessment of Energy
Transport Infrastructure, 2018 UTAH L. REV. 119, 146-48 (2018); Adebola S. Kasumu, Vivian
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company’s costs include not just the specific equipment used for the well but also a
fraction of many employees’ time, of equipment used at several wells, and of shared
company expenses. How big a fraction should apply to each specific well to calculate
its net profits? Few private landowners would want to regularly police such an
accounting.150
For countries, however, the accounting difficulties may be worth it. As noted,
receiving a share of net-profits ensures that the country still gets some profit from
marginal wells and gets a substantially larger benefit from bonanza wells. And if the
country assesses an income tax on net profits, it already must do some verification
of a company’s reported costs. A net-profits interest, however, requires significantly
more accounting than income taxation because the country must audit the costs
associated with each joint venture rather than simply looking at the company’s
overall profitability.151 Similarly, the country must verify a company’s costs for each
production sharing contract to determine how much cost oil the international oil
company should be allowed to recover under that contract.152
Net-profits interests have one more related downside; they may encourage
companies to spend more than is really necessary, lowering the profits that the oil
company shares with the national oil company. When an international oil company
is sharing the profits, the national oil company shares its costs as well as its
revenues—so the international oil company is only paying half of the cost of each
well. Sharing costs encourages excess spending on the well. After all, why not spend

Li, James W. Coleman, Jeanne Liendo & Sarah M. Jordaan, Country-Level Life Cycle
Assessment of Greenhouse Gas Emissions from Liquefied Natural Gas Trade for Electricity
Generation, 52 ENVTL. SCI. & TECH. 1735, 1739 (2018) (documenting world variation in
natural gas prices). As a result, oil companies often claim that gas was worth far less at the
well than what they sold it for after piping it to a more attractive market. See Heritage Res.,
Inc. v. NationsBank, 939 S.W.2d 118 (Tex. 1996); Abrahm Lustgarten, How Oil and Gas
Drillers Avoid Paying Royalties to Landowners, PACIFIC STANDARD (Aug. 30, 2013),
https://psmag.com/environment/oil-gas-drillers-avoid-paying-royalties-landowners-65236
[https://perma.cc/L43Q-NPA5] (last updated June 14, 2017). There are relatively fewer
disputes about the amount produced or about the price of oil, which trades at similar prices in
geographically distant markets.
150. The difficulties of needing to police such an accounting to ensure full value on a netprofits interest is well dramatized in the Hollywood context. See PIERCE O’DONNELL & DENNIS
MCDOUGAL, FATAL SUBTRACTION (1992) (describing Buchwald v. Paramount Pictures Corp.,
13 U.S.P.Q.2d 1497 (Cal. Super. Ct. 1990), among other cases).
151. Accounting for the cost and profit of each well is known as “ring-fencing.” Emil M.
Sunley, Thomas Baunsgaard & Dominique Simard, Revenue from the Oil and Gas Sector:
Issues and Country Experience, in FISCAL POLICY FORMULATION AND IMPLEMENTATION IN
OIL-PRODUCING COUNTRIES 157–58 (J.M. Davis, R. Ossowski & A. Fedelino eds., 2003).
152. If the government could perfectly calculate the cost of each well, it could presumably
extract all the economic rent from its oil and gas—all its value less the cost of extracting it and
a normal profit. See supra notes 56–59. But this is impossibly complex as the United States
found when it attempted to regulate natural gas prices. See Richard J. Pierce, Jr., Natural Gas
Regulation, Deregulation, and Contracts, 68 VA. L. REV. 63, 69–72 (1982) (citing DEP’T OF
ENERGY, REDUCING U.S. OIL VULNERABILITY, at II-B-27 (1980)) (explaining why, in practice,
this system locked in natural gas reserves that could otherwise have been sold profitably,
costing society between $2.5 and $5 billion per year).
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a bit more on the newest equipment or pay your employees slightly more when the
country is picking up half the bill? The oil company could even curry favor with its
regular outside contractors by paying them a bit extra for such a job and hope that
the contractor, in return, will offer it a better deal some other time when the company
is paying the full cost.
2. Limiting the Geographic and Time Scale of Concessions
Countries also realized that two other provisions of the typical U.S. lease were a
poor fit for nations that owned oil and gas. The leases were too unlimited in time and
area. As a result, oil companies could hold a near-permanent option on vast swaths
of land without drilling many wells or, consequently, providing much wealth to the
nations that signed these early agreements. In the United States, this problem was
often addressed by creative judicial interpretation of leases that forced oil companies
to drill more wells even when the plain terms of the lease seemed to impose no such
obligation.153 Nations facing this same problem soon began to modify their
agreements so that oil companies would share the nation’s interest in timely
production.
First, the indefinite term of these concessions proved to be an intolerable
limitation on sovereign states.154 Is it reasonable for a government to commit its
people’s resources for all time, or even for an indefinite “secondary term” that could
last a century? What if the form of government is in flux? Should new governments
really have no say in the operation of oil and gas companies in their territory? In
theory, should the government or a private company be willing to pay more for the
right to extract resources in a country seventy-five years from now? Most economists
say that this right should be worth little to a company, which has a high discount rate
and a short time horizon, and more to a nation, which typically can borrow money at
a cheaper rate than a private company and thus has less need for ready cash.155 In
accordance with this logic, countries began limiting their concessions to two or three
decades rather than six or more.156
Second, signing a concession for a huge government territory is very different
than signing an agreement for a single farmstead. Recall that a typical Texas oil and
gas lease may be maintained in perpetuity by a single well.157 As long as the oil
company keeps producing that single well, it has the exclusive option to produce
more oil from the land. When a new oil and gas boom rolls around, the company will
be able to drill for more oil under its existing lease, and the landowner will not be
able to shop around for a new oil company and higher royalty. If a farmstead knows

153. Pierce, supra note 50, at 452–57; Weaver, supra note 73, at 1485–94.
154. See Kenneth S. Carlston, Concession Agreements and Nationalization, 52 AM. J.
INT’L L. 260, 265–67 (1958) (discussing the problem of changed circumstances).
155. Lawrence H. Summers, Investment Incentives and the Discounting of Depreciation
Allowances, in THE EFFECTS OF TAXATION ON CAPITAL ACCUMULATION 300 (Martin Feldstein
ed., 1987) (reporting firm discount rates of 8% to 30%).
156. See David N. Smith & Louis T. Wells, Jr., Mineral Agreements in Developing
Countries: Structures and Substance, 69 AM. J. INT’L L. 560, 566 (1975).
157. Lowe, supra note 66, at 282.
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that it has multiple oil reservoirs on its land, it may want to take steps to ensure they
are leased separately.
But the countries that signed the early oil and gas concessions had countless oil
and gas reservoirs; it was simply intolerable that such large areas of land, covering
so many prospects, had been routinely given to one company.158 These large-area
concessions made it impossible to find out what level of royalties these countries
might have been able to secure in an open market. So countries began offering
smaller blocks of land for new concessions.159
By the end of the second age of oil and gas law, the balance of power had palpably
shifted to the new oil-producing countries in the Middle East and elsewhere. The
national oil companies of these countries dominated global production. These nations
used increasingly customized forms of host country agreements—concessions, joint
ventures, and production sharing contracts—making them the center of innovation
in international oil and gas law. And these new agreements provided oil-producing
countries with an increasing share of the oil produced from their land. But a new age
of oil would soon be born at the historic center of the oil industry, a petroleum
renaissance driven by fracking in the United States.
III. THE THIRD AGE OF OIL AND GAS LAW
The United States is in the middle of the biggest oil boom that the world has ever
seen. Directional drilling and hydraulic fracturing—colloquially known as
“fracking”160—have unlocked staggering quantities of oil and gas across the country.
The United States doubled its oil production between 2010 and 2018.161 By 2015, the
United States produced both more petroleum and more natural gas than any other
nation.162 Then in one year, the United States further increased its oil production by

158. Conversely, small tracts give rise to several problems that do not exist when the
country owns all oil and gas mineral resources. See, e.g., William O. Huie, Apportionment of
Oil and Gas Royalties, 78 HARV. L. REV. 1534 (1965).
159. See SMITH ET AL., supra note 91, at 448–49.
160. Some members of the oil industry have, at times, objected to the term “fracking” and
its spelling. In 2012, Chesapeake Energy’s vice president for Strategic Affairs argued that it
was a “a co-opted word and a co-opted spelling used to make it look as offensive as” possible.
Jonathan Fahey, ‘Fracking’: Made-Up Word Not Cracking Up The Natural-Gas Industry,
SEATTLE TIMES, Jan. 26, 2012, https://www.seattletimes.com/nation-world/fracking-made-up
-word-not-cracking-up-the-natural-gas-industry/ [https://perma.cc/B2HB-4LTN]. But the fact
is that it is the most common term for the process among both industry and the public. In fact,
by 2016, Chesapeake Energy’s vice president of operations was bragging that the company
had perfected the “monster frack,” a process of “unleashing hell on every gas molecule
downhole,” that it liked to call “propageddon.” Joe Carroll & David Wethe, Chesapeake
Energy
Declares
‘Propageddon’
With
Record
Frack,
BLOOMBERG,
https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2016-10-20/chesapeake-declares-propageddon
-with-record-frack-in-louisiana [https://perma.cc/3LGF-2DSX].
161. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: CRUDE OIL PRODUCTION,
https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_m.htm [https://perma.cc/K66VWKTU] (showing U.S. production rising by 2,081,000 million barrels per day from August
2017 to August 2018).
162. Hein, supra note 96, at 8.
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over two million barrels per day.163 A major oil power like Nigeria has been ramping
up its oil production for more than sixty years and still produces less than two million
barrels per day.164 The United States added that capacity to world oil production in
just a year, easily outpacing the biggest previous oil boom which occurred in Saudi
Arabia in the early 1970s.165 This boom dwarfs previous oil and gold rushes—there
is simply no historical analogue for the scale of the oil and gas revolution currently
sweeping the United States.166
This new age of oil has begun a third age of oil and gas law. It is being defined
by fracking, increased climate regulation, and more sophisticated landowners.
Fracking has mitigated some of the problems that required the existing body of
conservation law while raising new issues. At the same time, public landowners are
facing a new pressure that may cut against maximum production: growing concern
over the costs of climate change. With the new flood of oil, countries are realizing
that climate action may require curbs to oil production before their oil resources are
exhausted. Finally, public landowners have grown more sophisticated in their efforts
to ensure they receive maximum benefit from their oil and gas resources. This
Section concludes by suggesting how private landowners can learn from the
innovative new agreements devised by public landowners to ensure they receive full
benefit from the unprecedented boom flooding the country with new oil and gas
wealth.

163. Supra note 161.
164. Country Comparison: Crude Oil - Production, CIA WORLD FACTBOOK,
https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/rankorder/2241rank.html
[https://perma.cc/7WWM-ABMJ] (Nigeria produced 1,871,000 barrels of oil per day in 2016).
165. 2006 ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. ANN. ENERGY REV., supra note 108, at 309 tbl.11.5
(showing that the largest previous one-year jump was Saudi Arabia rising 1.58 million barrels
per day from 1972 to 1973). At that time, oil was worth $1.86 per barrel, which is $10.91 in
2017 dollars, so the market value of the current boom, which is 30% faster and with oil priced
at about $65 per barrel, is approximately seven times greater. M. Garside, Average Annual
OPEC Crude Oil Price From 1960 to 2019 (in U.S. Dollars Per Barrel), STATISTA,
https://www.statista.com/statistics/262858/change-in-opec-crude-oil-prices-since-1960/
[https://perma.cc/5ZCT-84B5] (last updated Sept. 18, 2019). And, of course, this oil boom
was accompanied by a staggering boom in natural gas production. James W. Coleman,
Importing Energy, Exporting Regulation, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 1357, 1364–66 (2014).
166. See supra note 165. For comparison, the California gold rush produced $50 million
in gold per year, with a peak of $80 million in 1852, which would be about $2.6 billion in
2018 dollars. See JOHN DOBSON, BULLS, BEARS, BOOM, AND BUST: A HISTORICAL
ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN BUSINESS CONCEPTS 82 (2007); MALCOLM J. ROHRBOUGH, DAYS
OF GOLD: THE CALIFORNIA GOLD RUSH AND THE AMERICAN NATION (1997); CPI Inflation
Caculator,
U.S.
Dollar
Inflation
Calculator,
https://www.officialdata.org/
[https://perma.cc/U8WZ-WZDM]. Just the annual increase in U.S. production in 2018 was
worth over $49 billion. U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN., PETROLEUM & OTHER LIQUIDS: CRUDE OIL
PRODUCTION, https://www.eia.gov/dnav/pet/pet_crd_crpdn_adc_mbblpd_m.htm
[https://perma.cc/QA4L-NCYL] (showing U.S. production rising by 2,081,000 barrels per
day from August 2017 to August 2018).
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A. Modifying the Rule of Capture for Fracking
Fracked wells are fundamentally different from conventional oil and gas wells
because they cost far more to complete, they produce more oil and gas up front and
then decline more rapidly, and they more commonly produce oil and gas together
because it is difficult to target just one or the other. To understand fracking, it is
helpful to first understand the conventional oil and gas production that preceded it.
Fossil fuels like oil, gas, and coal are all hydrocarbons—composed of carbon and
hydrogen atoms. These molecules can be burned to release carbon dioxide, energy,
and steam. The lightest hydrocarbon, with just one carbon and four hydrogen atoms
is methane, which comprises the vast majority of natural gas.167 Slightly heavier
hydrocarbons, with up to five linked carbon atoms, can either be gas or liquid,
depending on temperature and pressure—these are called natural gas liquids or
condensates.168 Crude oil is a mix of hydrocarbons that are yet heavier—the longer
the carbon chain, the heavier and thicker the oil.169
Oil and gas is formed from decomposed organic matter—once living creatures—
compressed underground at high temperatures until they became a mix of oil and gas
hydrocarbon molecules.170 Once formed, these hydrocarbons rise toward the earth’s
surface through permeable rocks until they run into a ceiling of impermeable rock.171
Because oil and gas can flow freely through the permeable reservoir beneath this
impermeable ceiling, the top of the reservoir typically contains gas, because it is
lighter, and the bottom of the reservoir typically contains the heavier oil.172 A
conventional oil and gas producer simply drills a well through the layer of
impermeable rock, accessing the free-flowing oil and gas in the permeable rock
“reservoir” beneath.173
Hydraulic fracturing and directional drilling extract oil from a different kind of
reservoir: fracking unlocks oil and gas that is trapped in tiny pores distributed through
impermeable shale rock layers.174 The drill first descends through a mile or more of
rock and then, over a few hundred feet, turns ninety degrees to horizontally thread
the targeted shale layer.175 The fracturing team uses a series of explosive charges to

167. U.S. DOMESTIC & INT’L BUS. ADMIN., STAFF HANDBOOK ON NATURAL GAS 6.5 (1975).
168. James W. Coleman & Alexandra B. Klass, Energy and Eminent Domain, 104 MINN.
L. REV. 659, 681 n. 119 (2019).
169. H.S. BELL, AMERICAN PETROLEUM REFINING 44–45 (1923).
170. Colby, supra note 4, at 250 (quoting Burke v. S. Pac. R.R., 234 U.S. 669, 679 (1914)).
171. See Ford, supra note 1, at 1176–77 (explaining oil and gas reservoirs with diagrams);
Colby, supra note 120, at 358.
172. Beverly May Carl, Comment, Conservation and Price Fixing in the California
Petroleum Industry, 29 S. CAL. L. REV. 470, 470 (1956) (explaining the “gas cap” at the top
of an oil and gas reservoir). Beneath both the gas and oil layers is a layer of water. Id.
173. Ford, supra note 1, at 1171–72 (describing how oil and gas flows out of the reservoir
into the well).
174. See Coleman & Klass, supra note 168, at 675; David B. Spence, Federalism,
Regulatory Lags, and the Political Economy of Energy Production, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 431,
438 (2013).
175. Amanda C. Leiter, Fracking, Federalism, and Private Governance, 39 HARV. ENVTL.
L. REV. 107, 112–13 (2015).
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precisely puncture this rock layer along the horizontal length of the well.176 These
initial cracks are then lengthened using high-pressure water that further fractures the
rock.177 Sand is mixed into this water to hold these cracks open once the water is
removed from the well.178 The previously trapped oil and gas is now able to flow
back up the well through the fractured shale rock.179 Because these oil and gas
molecules were trapped in impermeable rock before extraction, and could not move
around like oil and gas in a conventional reservoir, they never had the chance to
separate into crude oil and natural gas before they were extracted. So fracking can
produce an unpredictable mix of oil, gas, and natural gas liquids—that is, of short
and longer hydrocarbons.180
These new fracking techniques and technology are making wells increasingly
expensive compared to simple vertical wells,181 but they produce so much oil and gas
that they can be very profitable. And fracked wells can provide a profit more quickly
because they are producing more and more of their ultimate production in just the
first year or two of operation.182
Fracking modifies the traditional concerns addressed by the rule of capture.183
First, it mitigates the traditional problem of pulling oil from a common reservoir

176. See Thomas W. Merrill & David M. Schizer, The Shale Oil and Gas Revolution,
Hydraulic Fracturing, and Water Contamination: A Regulatory Strategy, 98 MINN. L. REV.
145, 153–54 (2013).
177. Coleman & Klass, supra note 168, at 675–76.
178. Id.
179. John M. Golden & Hannah Wiseman, The Fracking Revolution: Shale Gas as a Case
Study in Innovation Policy, 64 EMORY L.J. 955, 968–74 (2015) (describing the fracking
process).
180. Jude Clement, The Rise of U.S. Associated Natural Gas, FORBES (June 3, 2018),
https://www.forbes.com/sites/judeclemente/2018/06/03/the-rise-of-u-s-associated-naturalgas/#354fac5d4bd7 [https://perma.cc/37X3-NQDJ].
181. LEONARDO MAUGERI, THE SHALE OIL BOOM, A U.S. PHENOMENON, HARVARD BELFER
CENTER 12 (2013) (shale wells now cost $5.5 to $10.5 million each)
http://www.belfercenter.org/sites/default/files/legacy/files/USShaleOilReport.pdf
[https://perma.cc/D32P-H7KG]; Hydraulically Fractured Horizontal Wells Account for Most
New Oil and Natural Gas Wells, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (Jan. 30, 2018),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=34732 [https://perma.cc/V7F5-HSAH].
182. John Kemp, Why the Shale Revolution is Not About to End, REUTERS (Aug. 29, 2014),
http://www.reuters.com/article/shale-usa-drilling-kemp-idUSL5N0QZ3U720140829
[https://perma.cc/S7TK-2MGQ].
183. Colleen E. Lamarre, Note, Owning the Center of the Earth: Hydraulic Fracturing and
Subsurface Trespass in the Marcellus Shale Region, 21 CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 457, 470
(2011) (“Though the rule of capture limits landowners’ legal rights against other landowners
who extract oil and gas from common reservoirs, the process of hydraulic fracturing may differ
from other drilling processes and therefore provide for alternative theories of liability.”);
Murphy Expl. & Prod. Co.—USA v. Adams, 560 S.W.3d 105, 111 (Tex. 2018)
(“[C]ommentators have recognized that hydrocarbons in ‘the tight reservoirs developed by
horizontal drilling . . . are not susceptible to migration in the same fashion as found in
formations traditionally targeted by vertical drilling.’”) (quoting Benjamin Holliday, New Oil
and Old Laws: Problems in Allocation of Production to Owners of Non-Participating Royalty
Interests in the Era of Horizontal Drilling, 44 ST. MARY’S L.J. 771, 813 (2013)) (citing Kelly
Hwa, Note, Hydraulic Fracturing and Forced Pooling Laws: Why Fracking Operators’ Use
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underlying neighbors’ property. Fracking is designed to pull oil from impermeable
rock layers so oil will not flow from under a neighbor’s land unless that land is also
fractured.184 You may not drill under your neighbor’s land so to a first approximation,
fracking will not allow you to pull oil from your neighbor.185 Second, it somewhat
mitigates the traditional concern that a race for production will lead to a long-term
collapse in oil prices: production from fracked wells trails off quickly, so if prices
collapse from new wells, then companies will stop fracking, excess supply will
quickly dry up, and prices will recover.186 Thus, fracked wells naturally play a role
as a marginal source of new production.187

Source: Caleb Madere, Covert Capture: Hydraulic Fracturing and Subsurface Trespass in
Louisiana, 75 LA. L. REV. 865, 867 (2015).

Fracking, however, does create two new complications. First, although you cannot
drill under your neighbor’s land, if your horizontal wellbore comes close to the
property line, the rock fractures that spread from the wellbore may extend under your

of Decades-Old Laws to Compel Access to Properties Must Be Reexamined, 63 WAYNE L.
REV. 105, 121 (2017) (noting the non-migratory nature of shale gas and the minimal risk of
drainage from adjoining property in the horizontal drilling context)).
184. Coleman & Klass, supra note 168, at 675.
185. Hastings Oil Co. v. Tex. Co., 234 S.W.2d 389, 396 (Tex. 1950). If you have
permission from the neighboring surface owners, you may, however, drill through another
parties’ neighboring mineral estate, so long as you do not have an opening in the well, known
as a “take point” that would pull oil from their mineral estate. Lightning Oil Co. v. Anadarko
E&P Onshore, 520 SW.3d 39, 51 (Tex. 2017).
186. Likewise, if prices rise from growing demand, new fracking can produce a burst of
new oil to meet this demand.
187. Fracking’s quick payoff also helps companies limit their risk from long-term changes
to oil prices. Even if slowing global demand could limit oil prices in the future, that will have
little impact on fracked wells that provide their main payoff in just months after drilling.
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neighbor’s land.188 Are these fractures more like a slant well, drilled under your
neighbor’s land, or should they be ignored under the rule of capture?189 The Texas
courts have generally held that these fractures may be ignored,190 but courts
elsewhere have disagreed.191 Second, because you must actually drill through the
shale reservoir to extract oil, fracking creates a new urgency to secure the cooperation
of neighboring landowners. The rule of capture meant that a holdout landowner could
simply be ignored; wells on neighbors’ land would drain the full reservoir. But to
drill a horizontal well that could extend more than a mile, a driller must have
permission to drill under each property along this route. For this reason, several states
have expanded their force-pooling or unitization statutes, requiring reluctant
landowners to let companies drill beneath their property so that their neighbors can
extract the oil and gas under their land.192

188. E.g., FPL Farming Ltd. v. Envtl. Processing Sys., L.C., 351 S.W.3d 306 (Tex. 2011);
Coastal Oil & Gas Corp. v. Garza Energy Tr., 268 S.W.3d 1 (Tex. 2008).
189. Caleb Madere, Covert Capture: Hydraulic Fracturing and Subsurface Trespass in
Louisiana, 75 LA. L. REV. 865, 867 (2015).
190. Id.
191. Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12–CV–102, 2013 WL 2097397
(N.D.W.Va. Apr. 10, 2013), vacated by Stone v. Chesapeake Appalachia, LLC, No. 5:12–CV–
1022013, WL 7863861 (N.D.W.Va. July 30, 2013); see also Briggs v. Sw. Energy Prod. Co.,
184 A.3d 153 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2018), vacated and remanded, 2020 WL 355911, at *12–13 (Pa.
Jan. 22, 2020) (rejecting the argument that drainage from a neighbor’s property to a fracked
well is inherently a trespass and leaving undecided whether fractures extending on to a
neighbor’s property are a trespass).
192. See, e.g., 58 PA. STAT. AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 34.1 (West 2019); ABBY HARDER,
COMPULSORY POOLING LAWS: PROTECTING THE CONFLICTING RIGHTS OF NEIGHBORING
LANDOWNERS,
NATIONAL
CONFERENCE
OF
STATE
LEGISLATURES
(2014),
http://www.ncsl.org/research/energy/compulsory-pooling-laws-protecting-the-conflicting
-rights-of-neighboring-landowners.aspx [https://perma.cc/NTM6-D9Z6] (“The increase in the
use of horizontal fracturing has made mandatory pooling laws particularly relevant. Without
a mandatory pooling order, the owner of oil and gas on the opposite side of a non-consenting
gas owner could be ‘blocked’ so that the horizontal arms of the main hydraulic fracturing well
could not reach this property.”); Fenner L. Stewart, When the Shale Gale Hit Ohio: The
Failures of the Dormant Mineral Act, Its Heroic Interpretations, and Grave Choices Facing
the Supreme Court, 43 CAP. U. L. REV. 435, 436–38 (2015) (providing a history of the rise of
hydraulic fracturing in the United States and some of its legal consequences); Fenner L.
Stewart & Allan Ingelson, Regulating Energy Innovation: US Responses to Hydraulic
Fracturing, Wastewater Injection and Induced Seismicity, 35 J. ENERGY & NAT. RESOURCES
L. 109 (2017) (providing a history of, and introduction to, hydraulic fracturing in the United
States as well as some discussion of its rapid growth from 2010 to 2015); Fenner L. Stewart
& Anthony G. Cioni, Unconventional Risk Allocation: Managing the Lifecycle of Shale
Projects, THE NEGOTIATOR (Oct. 2015), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract
_id=2683633 [https://perma.cc/ML6F-HP49] (illustrating how the lifecycle of hydraulically
fractured assets is different than conventional assets, radically changing risk location between
participants in joint ventures, and demanding new contractual arrangements).
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B. Climate Limits
Climate change is making some countries reconsider one basic premise of the oil
and gas lease or concession: the presumption that more production is always in the
interest of the public landowner. The primary compensation for landowners who
lease their oil and gas resources is a royalty: a share of production. The landowner
does not pay the costs of production, so the landowner wants as much production as
soon as possible no matter the cost. As a result, when landowners draft a lease, they
typically add provisions designed to prod a lethargic or conservative oil company to
drill sooner and drill more.193 In recent years, countries have begun to consider how
these provisions in public leases may conflict with climate goals that may require a
slowdown in oil and gas production.
Alberta, for example, has placed a cap on overall greenhouse gas emissions from
its oil sands sector. Companies have responded by asking permission to “strand”
some oil—leaving barrels of oil in the ground rather than maximizing production.194
This is necessary because the typical concession, like the typical lease, requires an
oil and gas company to maximize production.195

193. And if a landowner does not include such provisions, an oil company with limited
resources may focus drilling on landowners who do.
194. Chester Dawson, Suncor Energy Seeks Permission to Abandon Some Oil-Sands
Assets, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 7, 2016), https://www.wsj.com/articles/suncor-energy-seekspermission-to-abandon-some-oil-sands-assets-1473286608 [https://perma.cc/M45J-QQ6J]
(“Canada’s largest oil producer, is in talks with government officials for permission to ‘strand,’
or abandon, some high cost and greenhouse gas-intensive crude-oil deposits, the company’s
chief executive said Wednesday. The Calgary-based company is seeking an easing of rules
designed to maximize oil-sands production from leases on government land, CEO Steve
Williams said at a Barclays energy conference in New York, reiterating a strategy he first
announced in July.”); Dan Healing, Suncor Proposes Leaving Oil Sands in Ground to Cut
Greenhouse Gas Emission Intensity, GLOBE & MAIL (July 28, 2016),
https://www.theglobeandmail.com/report-on-business/industry-news/energy-and-resources
/suncor-discussing-with-alberta-government-possibility-of-leaving-oil-in-ground/article
31153337/ [https://perma.cc/J9VA-XZ5X]; Jesse Snyder, Suncor Energy Inc Pushes
‘Stranded’ Assets Idea to Meet New Environmental Regulations, FIN. POST (Aug. 4, 2016),
https://business.financialpost.com/commodities/energy/suncor-energy-inc-swings-to-lossafter-alberta-wildfires-hit-production
[https://perma.cc/KNW7-SBTW]
(“Under
the
provincial energy regulator, oilsands operators are currently expected to produce the entirety
of their assets regardless of their respective emissions intensity—essentially a ‘no bitumen left
behind’ policy. But by selecting only the lowest emissions assets, a procedure known as ‘high
grading,’ Williams said Suncor’s oilsands operations could be between 10 and 20 per cent
more efficient.”).
195. See supra note 193. Note that the carbon externality associated with its own oil
extraction is, in economic terms, a much larger issue for public landowners than private
landowners. A private landowner’s decision whether or not to extract will make a vanishingly
small contribution to climate change and the individual landowner will experience only a tiny
fraction of the harm from climate change. This may require a moral calculation, but in
economic terms it does not compare to the value of the oil extracted. The calculation is far
different for regulators representing economic and energy powerhouses that can significantly
lower greenhouse gas emissions and will capture much of the benefit from lower emissions.
Cf. James W. Coleman, Unilateral Climate Regulation, 38 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 87, 92–93
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In a parallel development, several jurisdictions are transitioning their oil and gas
regulators to a dual focus on environmental and resource revenue goals. For example,
the governor and majority leaders of Colorado recently proposed a major overhaul
of the state’s oil and gas commission.196 The proposed bill, which was enacted in
April of 2019, broadens the focus of the commission from simply fostering the oil
and gas industry to also protecting health, safety, wildlife, and the environment.197
Similarly, there is currently a movement among scholars and environmental groups
to ensure that U.S. oil and gas concessions balance the monetary benefits of
extraction with the externalities caused by burning fossil fuels.198 As more oil and
gas producing jurisdictions consider adopting climate regulations, they will have to
consider how their government’s interest in protecting the value of their
hydrocarbons should be balanced with their climate goals.
Finally, even in countries that have not yet adopted laws to implement their
climate commitments, investors and other stakeholders are increasingly asking
companies how they will reconcile their investment in extraction with the new
policies that are implied by nations’ climate commitments.199
C. Perfecting the Concession and the Lease
In this new age of oil and gas law, both private and public landowners are
perfecting the legal instruments they use to extract maximum value from their oil and
gas resources. Public landowners are adopting hybrid systems that incorporate some
of the best aspects of the traditional concession and profit-sharing agreements. These
more sophisticated agreements are also being optimized for oil prospects that are
most likely to be produced by fracking. And the historical pattern of countries
adapting agreements originally made for private landowners has begun to reverse:
private landowners are now learning from the innovative agreements developed by
public landowners. Private landowners still have catching up to do and could learn
from the most recent innovations of public landowners to earn more from their oil
and gas prospects.
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197. S.B. 19-181, 72d Gen. Assemb., Reg. Sess. (Colo. 2019).
198. Jayni Foley Hein, Federal Lands and Fossil Fuels: Maximizing Social Welfare in
Federal Energy Leasing, 42 HARV. ENVTL. L. REV. 1, 18–23 (2018). This approach has begun
to have success in the courts—a recent decision struck down a United States Bureau of Land
Management leasing plan for failing to consider the climate consequences of extracting oil
and gas. Wildearth Guardians v. Zinke, 368 F. Supp.3d 41, 41 (D.D.C. 2019).
199. Fenner L. Stewart, Dominium and The Empire of Laws, 36 WINDSOR YEARBOOK ACC.
JUST. 36 (2019) (showing how the corporate social responsibility is pushing companies to
address climate change); Fenner L. Stewart & Anthony G. Cioni, Holistic Security Risk
Management Strategies for E&Ps: Optimizing Performance by Reducing Surface Risk, 11 J.
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1. New Public Landowner Agreements
The best example of new innovative public agreements comes from Alberta’s
2015–16 Royalty Review.200 Before the review, Alberta had a typical concession
system with a few adaptations that had been added over time.201 This typical
concession had oil companies pay set royalties on oil and gas and compete for
concessions by bidding more or less bonus in open auctions.202 Over time, the
province had made some modifications designed to encourage continued production
during bad times and take a larger share during good times. For example, Alberta
used separate royalties on oil and natural gas that were each set by sliding scales that
depended on current prices for each commodity.203 The province had also added
some provisions designed to allow production from particularly expensive wells such
as wells drilled to frack shale formations. In particular, Alberta allowed a lower 5%
initial royalty rate on wells drilled beyond a certain total length, including both the
vertical and horizontal section.204 Each of these kludges could be seen as efforts to
mimic some of the benefits of a net-profits system—raising the royalty rate when oil
and gas prices were high to share in some of the benefit of bonanza wells and
lowering the royalty rate when oil and gas prices were low, or the cost of extraction
was high, to ensure that marginal wells were still developed.205
The Royalty Review attempted to rationalize this scattered system while
addressing the changes wrought by the new prominence of fracking.206 First, because
fracking tends to produce a mix of both gas and oil hydrocarbons, the Review
recommended a single system for all hydrocarbons.207 The previous system set
separate royalty rates for gas, natural gas liquids, and oil, which varied based on the
price of each commodity and the volume produced.208 These separate systems
created problems when companies feared that a well, profitable on the assumption
that the gas royalty rates would apply, would be unprofitable if the company struck
oil instead, given the different rates applicable to that commodity.209 The new royalty
set a single standard based on the amount of money, in hydrocarbons, pulled out of
the well.210 For a given amount of dollars in hydrocarbons pulled from the well—
whether natural gas, natural gas liquids, or oil—the royalty rate would be set at a
certain price: the more valuable the total volume of hydrocarbons pulled out of the
well, the higher the royalty rate.211

200. The author was employed as an expert to conduct this review for the province of
Alberta, but this paper does not contain non-public information concerning that review.
201. ALBERTA ROYALTY REVIEW, ALBERTA AT A CROSSROADS: ROYALTY REVIEW
ADVISORY PANEL REPORT 5–6 (2015).
202. See supra notes 96–98 and accompanying text.
203. Id. at 22.
204. Id. at 62.
205. See supra Section III.B.
206. ALBERTA ROYALTY REVIEW, supra note 201, at 36.
207. Id. at 62.
208. Id.
209. Id. at 58.
210. Id. at 62.
211. Id.
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Second, because fracked wells cost more, the new royalty system provided a way
for oil companies to recover the cost of the well: the oil company would pay a lower,
5% royalty until it had received the average cost of a well in hydrocarbons from its
completed prospect.212 This average “drilling and completion cost” allowance is
calculated to cover the average cost of drilling and completing a well in the specific
formation where the producer is operating.213 Thus, a shallow formation that is
produced by a simple conventional vertical well will likely have a low average cost,
whereas a deep formation that can only be produced through a long well and
extensive fracking will generally have a substantially higher average cost.214 The
allowance ensures that when a well produces oil, producers will pay the minimal 5%
royalty until they have recovered the average cost of a well in that formation—so a
company can be relatively certain of earning its investment back if its well hits oil. 215
This provision has most of the advantages of a net profit interest: by allowing
companies to recover the cost of an average well, it ensures that even marginal
prospects will be drilled, realizing some benefit for the government from prospects
that would be sterilized by a standard royalty system. And, also like a net profits
interest, it ensures that bonanza wells award the landowner a larger share of the wells’
net profit because the royalty rate increases dramatically after a well has paid back
its cost.
At the same time, the drilling and completion cost allowance avoids the two
principal downsides of a net profit system. It does not require the landowner, Alberta,
to account for the cost of drilling an individual well by an individual company;
instead, Alberta simply uses the average industry-wide cost of drilling a well. 216 As
a result, the allowance also fully preserves the incentive for oil companies to keep
their costs down. If a company spends less than the average company, it keeps the
full benefit because it still gets the 5% royalty rate until the average cost of a well is
recovered.217 Conversely, if a company spends more than average, it pays the excess
and the government is not forced to sort out these high cost wells to determine
whether the company was merely unlucky or undisciplined in its spending, or worse,
was padding its expenses.
Alberta is not the only jurisdiction to move to a more sophisticated system for
extracting value from its oil and gas resources. Mexico has also moved to a hybrid
system that allows the country to benefit from a mix of royalty and net profit
payments through a unique production sharing contract system.218 Just in 2014 and
2015, over twenty jurisdictions across the world were looking to modify the fiscal

212. Id. at 58–59.
213. Id. at 86–87.
214. Id. at 84–85.
215. Id. at 61.
216. Id. at 11.
217. Id. at 58.
218. WILSON CTR. MEX. INST., MEXICO'S NEW ENERGY REFORM 44–45 (2018),
https://scholarship.law.tamu.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=2224&amp;context=facscholar
[https://perma.cc/A2MG-4WWV]; AKIN GUMP STRAUSS HAUER & FELD LLP, MEXICO’S
ENERGY INDUSTRY ROUND 2.4: MEXICO’S DEEP WATER SUCCESS (2018),
https://www.akingump.com/images/content/6/4/v2/64429/Client-Alert-2.1.18-FinalVersion.pdf [https://perma.cc/JS54-X43X].
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terms of their host country agreements including energy powerhouses like Russia,
Iran, Nigeria, and China.219 As fracking increases oil and gas production around the
globe, countries will no doubt move to revise their royalty systems to adopt some of
these innovative provisions.
2. New Leasing Practices
In the third age of oil and gas law, innovations in resource owner legal protections
have begun to flow back from public owners in the developing world to private
landowners in the United States. U.S. landowners have begun to realize that, like
countries, they can write leases that provide them a bigger share of the oil and gas
from very profitable wells without scaring oil companies away from marginal wells.
But landowners can and should go further to incorporate the lessons of modern
hybrid royalty systems that capture more of the upside of bonanza wells.
Sophisticated private landowners have begun to adopt some of the innovations
developed by public landowners.220 For example, some private landowners have also
begun to require shorter primary terms and higher royalties.221 Some landowners
have even followed countries in placing limits on the secondary term, dictating that
even a producing well cannot extend a lease forever unless the oil company pays a
minimum royalty.222
Landowners should go further to incorporate the lessons of advanced systems like
that adopted by Alberta. For one thing, like Alberta, they could use royalties that
increase once an oil and gas company has received a set amount of value out of a
well. Even if this amount does not exactly equal the average cost of drilling a well,
this structure assures the oil company that the royalty will not rise unless it has taken
a substantial amount of money out of the well. In some ways, this practice extends
the older idea of a “production payment,” which is a set sum that will only be paid
out of production—that is, money that will be paid if the well is successful but will
not be paid on a dry well.223

219. ALBERTA ROYALTY REVIEW, supra note 201, at 112; see also Petrobras CEO
Questions
PSC
Contract
Model,
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MEDIA
(Aug.
20,
2019),
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[https://perma.cc/3X7V-924V] (describing potential revisions to Brazil’s host government
agreement system).
220. See Pierce, supra note 50, at 478–79 (describing these alternative legal agreements).
221. Nicholas Miller, Negotiating an Oil and Gas Lease, http://aglaw.libsyn.com/episode
-33-nicholas-miller-negotiating-an-oil-and-gas-lease [https://perma.cc/LF27-2L4W] (stating
that the standard was once a 1/8 royalty and five-to-ten-year primary term, but the standard
now is a 1/4 royalty with three-year primary term).
222. JUDON FAMBROUGH, HINTS ON NEGOTIATING AN OIL AND GAS LEASE, REAL EST.
CENT. (1997), http://counties.agrilife.org/lasalle/files/2011/03/negotiating_oil_gas_lease.pdf
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223. Robert E. Hardwicke, The Purchase of Producing Oil or Gas Properties by Use of a
Production Payment, 33 TEX. L. REV. 848, 848-49 (1955) (explaining the purpose and practice
of production payments).

2020]

OI L A ND GA S LA W

429

Scholars have long noted that net profits would better align the incentives of oil
and gas companies with landowners and suggested that more landowners should
include a net-profits interest in their leases.224 But they have cautioned that this
solution will not be practical unless drafters can devise an instrument that surmounts
the practical difficulty of forcing landowners to audit expenses of an oil and gas
company to determine its net profits on a well.225 Alberta has provided a rough-andready solution: simply allow the company to recover a negotiated and fixed value of
oil and gas out of the well that will approximate its costs and then take a much larger
share of the subsequent oil.
Second, like Alberta, landowners should adopt a unified system for oil and gas
royalties. Separate oil and gas clauses made some sense when development typically
targeted one or the other mineral. In the early years of oil production, natural gas was
often considered little better than a nuisance because it could be prohibitively
expensive to transport it to a market where it could be sold; early leases sometimes
offered landowners a mere yearly fee for a gas well rather than a royalty share.226
Natural gas liquids, when present, were often governed by a separately negotiated
clause that could be even more complex.227 But fracking unlocks mixed oil and gas
molecules trapped in the source rock, so a lease that contemplates fracking should
have a royalty clause that works well for whatever mix of crude oil, natural gas
liquids, and gases are found in the ground.228 Alberta has found a unified solution
that will also be much simpler for private landowners: the more valuable the
hydrocarbons out of the well—whether gas, or natural gas liquids, or oil—the larger
share paid by the oil company.229 Landowners can rely on these legal innovations to
ensure they receive full benefit from the unprecedented oil and gas boom sweeping
the nation.
CONCLUSION
History’s biggest oil boom is happening now in the United States and ushering in
the third age of oil and gas law. Like the two previous ages, this new age brings with
it revolutionary private and public law instruments to manage this new wealth. New
lease agreements and new concession systems are ensuring that private and public
landowners receive the full benefit of their oil and gas. Old conservation laws are
being modified to address new technologies like directional drilling and hydraulic
fracturing. And public landowners must now reconcile their climate regulation with

224. Pierce, supra note 50, at 475–76.
225. Id. at 476–77; cf. Goldberg, supra note 64, at 528–29 (showing how Hollywood
companies manipulate “net profits” calculations to limit compensation to creative artists).
226. Hardwicke, Jr., supra note 65, at 791.
227. Id. at 794–95.
228. This would also avoid problems like shut-in clauses that do not allow shut-in of a well
that produces mostly gas and just some oil. Nancy J. Forbis, The Shut-in Royalty Clause:
Balancing the Interests of Lessors and Lessees, 67 TEX. L. REV. 1129 (1989). Under such a
lease, the oil and gas company may be forced to produce the small amount of oil and flare a
large amount of gas that could, in time, provide the primary economic benefit from the well.
229. ALBERTA ROYALTY REVIEW, supra note 201, at 57 (describing how to “[h]armonize
the royalty structures across crude oil, liquids and natural gas”).
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their concessions’ systems focus on encouraging rapid production of oil and gas. A
new age of oil and gas law has dawned and a new generation of oil and gas lawyers
must arise to meet its challenges.

